commands. For instance, the Indonesian Constitutional Court takes the view that
one of the principal differences of the rule of law between Indonesia and the West
is that ‘the basis of Belief in God and teaching, as well as religious values, serves as a
benchmark to determine whether or not a certain law is good, or even whether or
not a certain law is constitutional’.^44 Has the court gone too far?
iii. concluding remarks
An examination of major constitutional development in Indonesia reveals that
there has been increasing commitment to support democracy and the rule of
law. Amendments to the 1945 constitution ( 1999 – 2002 ) demonstrate that Indonesia
has taken a hard lesson and there will be no turning back to the old Soeharto model
of governance. However, it would be misleading to assume that the amendments to
the 1945 constitution would automatically bring the Indonesian people out of
economic, political and legal crisis, especially when corruption remains endemic.
Reform not only strengthens the structure of the three arms of government, but also
creates new institutions, such as the House of Regional Representatives, the
Judicial Commission and the Constitutional Court. A new key player also emerges:
the political party.
Political parties may be the weakest link in the electoral process if they are
undemocratic, underdeveloped and nonconstructive.
45
Political parties cannot
be trusted to have democratic ideas or programmes if they are tolerant of corruption
(if not, indeed, active in it), self-centred, inward-looking, exclusive and, therefore,
unrepresentative and unresponsive to voters’ real interests and citizens’ real
needs for development.^46 In other words, how parties behave toward one another,
and in their internal organisation, tells their fellow citizens how democracy works.
The Indonesian party system is characterised by charismatic leaders. The ‘patron–
client relationship’ still influences Indonesian politics, where economic rewards and
political patronage flowed downward in the system, whilst political loyalty flowed
upward, in what resembled a giant pyramid of patrimonial relationships. Even
before the introduction of thepilkada(short forpilihan kepala daerah, ‘election
of regional heads’), political thuggery and ‘money politics’ were on the rise.^47
For instance, MPs act as brokers for private companies, businessmen take over
party chairmanships, and billionaire financiers determine policies behind the
scenes. According to Rinakit, 87 per cent of regional elections in 2005 were won
(^44) Ibid.
(^45) See Ed Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner,Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia(Singapore:
ISEAS, 2010 ).
(^46) Ivan Doherty, ‘Democracy out of balance: civil society can’t replace political parties’
(April–May 2001 )Policy Review 29.
(^47) N. Choi, ‘Local elections and party politics in post-reformasi Indonesia: a view from
Yogyakarta’ (August 2004 )Contemporary Southeast Asia 280.