Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century

(Greg DeLong) #1

Although the Constitution does not explicitly deal with governance gaps, two


aspects are worth noting. First, a combined reading of Articles 12 and 13 means that


all government actions, both legislative and executive, must conform to FRs –


implying thereby that the government should not, for instance, treat similarly


placed people in an unequal manner; indulge in arbitrary arrests or detentions;


allow the practice of child labour, gender discrimination or untouchability; and


discriminate against minorities. Second, Article 37 declares that DPs are ‘funda-


mental in the governance of the country’ and that the government is obliged to


apply them in making laws. This provision again infuses good governance in the


formulation of laws and arguably also, by implication, in their implementation.


As far as remedying environmental pollution is concerned, Article 48 A provides


that the state ‘shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to


safeguard the forests and wild life of the country’.^137 Even citizens have a


fundamental duty ‘to protect and improve the natural environment including forests,


lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures’.
138
The


judiciary has also recognised the right to a pollution-free environment as an FR.
139


How can one analyse the relationship between constitutional developments and


the three challenges identified in this chapter? Two broad points can be made.


First, there has been no dearth of executive, legislative and judicial measures


tackling socio-economic inequalities, governance gaps and environmental pollu-


tion. However, despite these measures, not much progress has been made in


overcoming the challenges. One should then ask questions about the implementa-


tion efficacy of the legislative and executive measures. The propriety and efficacy of


judicial measures in strengthening good governance or promoting sustainable


development should also be evaluated. As I have argued elsewhere, PIL should


not be used by the Supreme Court to govern the country on a day-to-day basis by


trying to do everything by itself – from legislating to monitoring the execution of


laws and adjudicating disputes.^140 The Supreme Court lacks the means, resources,


legitimacy and authority to fix all social problems. It is also ill-equipped to


understand the complex socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country. Nor


does it fully understand the resource implications or practical feasibility of imple-


menting its decisions.


Second, one can also note that whereas the executive and legislature have been


more active in bridging socioeconomic inequalities, it is the judiciary that has


shown greater zeal in fighting governance gaps. One explanation for this difference


(^137) This provision was inserted by the Constitution ( 42 nd Amendment) Act 1976.
(^138) The Constitution of India, Art. 51 (g).
(^139) See, for example,Vellore Citizens Welfare Forumv.Union of India( 1996 ) 5 SCC 647 ;
Narmada Bachao Andolanv.Union of India( 2000 ) 10 SCC 664.
(^140) Surya Deva, ‘Constitutional courts as positive legislators: the Indian experience’ in Allan
Brewer-Carias (ed.),Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislatures: A Comparative Law
Study(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011 ), p. 587.


The Indian constitution in the twenty-first century 365

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