complex attempts to reconcile the forms of constitutionalism with one-party
Leninist states. The hybrid documents also reflect certain trends found in regimes
of those types elsewhere. The theme of this section is that, given the varieties of
constitutional order, Asia is an internally diverse region. We also argue that it is not
appropriate to think of Asian constitutionalism as merely sham orfauxconstitu-
tionalism. It has, in every society save perhaps North Korea, real bite and real
effects, even if these are manifest through complex channels unfamiliar to those
who limit their view of constitutionalism to liberal democracies.
Next, the chapter provides some evidence from a large comparative project on
constitutions, to understand the formal features of constitutional texts. This part of
the chapter essentially tests the Asian Values and global convergence arguments.
Are Asian constitutions really different? Using “large-n” tools is not the only way of
deriving this question, but it does provide one way of seeing whether there indeed
are gross patterns that would only be apparent from a bird’s-eye view. The results
are surprising. The exercise shows that Asian constitutions are marked by high
levels oflegislativepower and relatively low levels ofexecutivepower. In formal
terms, Asian executives are relatively weak compared to those in other countries,
surprisingly to those who view the region as one of strong states. More interestingly,
the constitutions of Asian countries contain no fewer rights than do those of
Western countries, except in the area of criminal procedure.
The inquiry is relevant to the debate on whether there are continuing legacies in
the modern era of the region’s long and distinct traditions of thinking about the
organization of political power. While I accept, and argue elsewhere,^3 that
these may continue to have some influence on institutions today, I find little
evidence of this in the formal texts of national constitutions. One would expect
that the Asian countries would, if their traditional patterns persisted, have relatively
unconstrained executives and few rights. But we do not see this. Any lingering
traditional influence, such as it is, is likely to be found in the style and patterns of
constitutional implementation, rather than in its form per se.
The conclusion brings together the various threads of the analysis to juxtapose the
two discrete analytical points developed in separate parts of the chapter. If formal
constitutions in the region differ in systematic ways from those found elsewhere, and
if they also, to some extent, accurately describe many features of political life, we
can speak of broad trends toward an Asian style of constitutional order. The observed
pattern, however, suggests that Asian Values arguments are overstated, except in the
area of criminal procedure. Asian constitutions are different but not in the way
predicted by advocates of traditional Asian Values. To the extent Asian constitution-
alism is discrete, it seems to be in the existence of a still robust tradition of Leninist
(^3) Tom Ginsburg, “Confucian constitutionalism: globalization and judicial review in Korea
and Taiwan” ( 2000 ) 27 ( 4 )Law and Social Inquiry 763 ; Tom Ginsburg, “Constitutionalism:
East Asian antecedents.” ( 2012 ) 88 Chicago-Kent Law Review 11.