domestic constitutional issues and international issues and the independence of
sovereign nations’ control of national economies. In response, the status of the people
in this changing environment needs to be readjusted to new developments. However,
it is not certain that the proposals suggested can accommodate such visions.
In August 2008 , the Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Constitutional
Revision for the Speaker of the National Assembly was published, proposing many
constitutional amendments summarized in three points. First, the Bill of Rights
should be reorganized to include the right to life and security, the “basic right” to
information, and so on. Second, constitutional reform should abridge the presi-
dent’s power by changing the form of government from the current “five year single
term presidency” to a semi-presidential or premier–presidential system. Third, the
judicial system should be democratized and rationalized by adopting new insti-
tutions and changing the formation of the judiciary, including the Constitutional
Court. Proposed judicial reforms include the repeal of the recommendation power
of the chief justice of the Supreme Court for his associate justices when there is a
vacancy, the introduction of abstract norm control (constitutional review of legisla-
tion without specific cases or controversies), and the transfer of jurisdiction of
election suits from the ordinary courts to the Constitutional Court.
Despite the plausibility of the arguments for constitutional reform at the execu-
tive and judicial levels, it should be borne in mind that the targeted reforms may
also be achieved by legislative changes without constitutional revision. Substantial
public supports for constitutional revision cannot be obtained until it is the only
effective solution to the target constitutional problems.^4
Furthermore, regardless of the persuasiveness of constitutional reform or
opposition to it, it is the will of the sovereign people that decides whether or not
a new constitution is necessary. In the midst of an economic crisis, it is unlikely that
reform of constitutional design can attract public enthusiasm. Even if amendment
cannot be avoided, what should be given more attention is not only the relationship
between the legislature and the executive but also how to enhance the independ-
ence and effectiveness of other branches, such as the judiciary, the Constitutional
Court, the Election Commission, and the Board of Audit and Inspection.
Emergence of the Constitutional Court as the centre of political co-ordination
A notable development in the operation of state institutions is increasing awareness
of the actual importance of the Constitutional Court in relation to matters of
“mega-politics.” Compared to its predecessors in Korean constitutional history,
(^4) For a rough examination of the Final Report from this point of view, see Jongcheol Kim,
“Does Korean democracy really need another constitutional revision? A critical review on
proposals of the Advisory Commission for Constitutional Revision for the Speaker of the
National Assembly” (in Korean) ( 2010 ) 38 Korean Journal of Law and Society 125.