AUGUST 2017 FORBES INDONESIA | 21The global media’s storyline was
that “hardline Islamism” drove a non-
Muslim from office. This is a com-
pelling narrative. Indonesia is one of
the few functional liberal democra-
cies in the Muslim world, with over
200 million Muslims. With terrorism
in Europe and the Trump adminis-
tration targeting Muslims, extremist
religious messaging would appear as
an effort to stoke the electorate. This,
combined with the controversial
blasphemy case against the incum-
bent, resulted in “hardline Islamism”
dominating the headlines.
Lost in the noise has been any
real discussion of how the winners
actually ran their campaign to win
the vote. The Anies-Sandiaga ticket
won a landslide 16-point victory in
a two-round election against Ahok,
who started the campaign with a
65% eligibility rating. Ahok ended up
with just 42% of the vote. It is unclear
that Jakarta voters overwhelmingly
turned against the incumbent only
because of the extremist religious
messaging. In fact, there may be more
to the story. Indonesia’s Islamist po-
litical parties have done poorly in
recent polls, historically garnering
under 10% of the national vote. This
meager voting block does not trans-
late into a 16-point win. Furthermore,
the incumbent’s numbers were drop-
ping well before religious issues arose
in the campaign in late 2016.
That said, extremist religious
messages were given a platform dur-
ing the campaign and the nation’s
blasphemy laws were turned against
Ahok. These are frightening and de-
structive developments, worthy of
intense public scrutiny. Yet a closer
inspection of the Anies and Sandiaga
(known as Sandi) campaign reveals
one built on a foundation of funda-
mentally sound data, consistent mes-
saging and extraordinary voter out-
reach. The hardline Islamist narrative
may sell newspapers, but I would
argue it was not the election’s deter-
mining factor. A strong argument can
be made that Anies and Sandi have
run the first modern, data-driven
campaign in Indonesia’s history.
I worked with Sandi from the early
planning for his campaign in 2015. He
was a successful businessman, well re-
garded in Indonesian and the interna-
tional circles—but largely an unknown
for Jakartans. Modern campaigns are
new to Indonesia. The process involves
collecting data on what drives voters’
decisions, shaping a message on this
data for the candidate, and getting that
message to voters. Done properly, this
approach helps the democratic process
as it enhances the relationship between
the public and candidates.
The campaign launched a base-
line survey in late 2015 to understand
where Sandi stood compared with
other actual and potential candi-
dates. The results were discourag-
ing. Sandi’s electability was 0.4% and
the incumbent at 65%. However, the
incumbent’s weaknesses were in re-
lation to constituents, and his blunt
style. Voters liked his direct man-
ner, but disliked that he overdid his
attacks. His aggressiveness was an
asset but became a liability when it
became personal. The campaign also
identified weaknesses in his policies.
Voters were generally happy with his
governance, but felt he focused too
much on large projects, particularly
infrastructure.
The campaign surveyed thou-
sands of Jakarta residents, acquired
data relevant to voter behavior, and
used data analytics to understand the
results. Some of the voter data was
surprising. For example, most as-
sumed that Jakarta’s traffic and flood-
ing were two issues that preoccupied
voters when choosing a governor.
They were not. The campaign also
expected that a platform offering to
improve Jakarta’s poor infrastructure
would attract voters. Not really.
The data showed that Jakarta vot-
ers cared overwhelmingly about threeissues: good jobs, controlling the cost
of living, and a good education for
their children. These issues formed
the core of Sandi’s platform as he be-
gan to introduce himself to Jakarta
voters in early 2016. The incumbent
had not prioritized these economic
issues. One of the surprising findings
from the early research was that Ja-
karta voters were not inclined to vote
based on religion. In fact, a significant
percentage of voters were offended by
the question.
Two of the three key messages
identified were a good fit with Sandi’s
background. He had created tens of
thousands of jobs in the process of
building Saratoga Capital, Indone-
sia’s premier investment company.
He could also make a credible case in
tackling the cost of living issue. Anies
answered the third issue, education,
due to his experience as the former
Minister of Education.
While the campaign used TV and
social media to reach voters—a normal
strategy—the content of these broke
ground in several areas. The content
was carefully tailored to reflect the
data-driven economic messages that
mattered, and accurate demographic
data allowed for better targeting. San-
di also made large, early investments
in TV, spending several million dollars
to introduce himself to Jakartans more
than six months before other potential
candidates did so.
Sandi also began an inten-
sive schedule of campaign events
throughout Jakarta in early 2016. He
wanted to get to know Jakartans one-
on-one, so he could confirm wheth-
er the economic messages from theA strong argument can
be made that Anies
and Sandi have run
the first modern, data-
driven campaign in
Indonesia’s history.