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Moscow. In this regards, legislation regarding restrictions of civil and political
liberties in Central Asia, for example, is often welcomed by Moscow. This legal
uniformity is presented as an attempt to ensure regional order and stability, and is
institutionally supported by the Interparliamentary Assembly of Member Nations
of the CIS and by Article 20 of the CIS Charter, which emphasises the importance
of “co-ordination of national legislations”. Finally, Russia also tries to exert cultural
influence in Central Asia via media, books and other soft power tools, as well as by
representing the top destination for working migrants from the region. This last
aspect significantly blurs the lines between soft and hard power, as Russia often
puts the “migrant question” on the table to exert political pressure on Central Asian
states, in particular Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
However the region is not homogeneous. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have
remained in a more marginal position with respect to multilateral formats of se-
curity, as none of them is a member either of the CSTO or the EEU. This may lead
one to think that Russia’s strategy in Central Asia is best characterised by what
Alexander Cooley and Marlene Laruelle have called a “more focused logic of hi-
erarchy”, which involves deeper ties with a narrower group of states, specifically
gravitating towards Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.The deep pocket of ChinaFor the time being, China is the main economic actor in the region. In other
words, the game played by Beijing in Central Asia is based on the domestic need
for energy resources, investments, infrastructure and development. If the US sees
the region as inherently linked to Afghanistan, and Russia sees it as an appendix of
its previous Soviet identity, China sees it as an extension of the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (XUAR), a western region of China where the population is
predominantly Muslim and which has several ethnic, cultural and historical ties
with Central Asia.
Beijing has long sought to include XUAR in the wider security and economic
framework, in order to enhance its control over the area. In recent years, dem-
onstrations and calls for autonomy from XUAR have been more frequent and
consistent, which Beijing sees as a challenge to its territorial integrity perpetuated
through occasional acts of violence. Thus, the recent infrastructural project called
the “Belt and Road Initiative”, aimed at linking China to Europe via Central Asia,
can be seen as serving Beijing’s internal purposes. By recently including India and
Pakistan in the SCO and building a strong anti-terrorism co-operation to fight
extremism and separatism, China seeks to ensure greater stability around XUAR.Opinion & Analysis The new Great Game that is not, Filippo Costa Buranelli