New Eastern Europe - November-December 2017

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From a military perspective, China is keen to leave the ground to Russia. From
an economic and infrastructural viewpoint, however, Beijing is becoming more
assertive, to the point that some countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
have seen protests and violent demonstrations against the Chinese, especially with
respect to land concessions and low environmental
standards. Countries like Turkmenistan and Tajikistan
are now heavily dependent on Chinese demands (for
energy in the case of the former and land in the case
of the latter) in return for investments. This may cre-
ate a relation of strong economic dependency in the
future. In the Central Asian context, both Russia and
China have managed to achieve their goals without
clashing abrasively with one another, partially because
China is interested in order and stability, which are well facilitated by the “axis of
convenience” with Russia. At least thus far, therefore, the Russo-Chinese co-oper-
ation in Central Asia has been workable and Beijing seems to have an interest in
keeping the region under Russia’s political and security umbrella.

The real protagonists

The three strategies outlined above should not, however, obscure the fact that
the Central Asian republics are actively engaging the great powers by relying on
their sovereign prerogatives and pursuing their own strategic goals. This further
weakens the notion of a new Great Game. If anything, the Central Asian states do
have preferences, goals, aims and strategies, too, as well as interests and disinter-
ests, political allegiances, regional balances of loyalties and alignments. The US has
been expelled militarily from the region, both from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
in recent years, but has been kept as a security partner and provider of weapons.
Russia’s influence has been diluted over the years by welcoming China as an im-
portant player which has prevented it from establishing a coherent hegemonic bloc
in the region. Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s reluctance to join Russia-led mul-
tilateral formats is a case in point. Concerns about the importance of internation-
al law and territorial integrity repeatedly voiced in international fora after Russia’s
intervention in Ukraine have also found more prominence in Central Asian coun-
tries’ foreign policy discourses. With respect to China, its economic interests in
the region have been aligned with those of the elite and the ruling cadres in Cen-
tral Asia, thus proving once again that the Central Asian republics are not passive
observers in the redefinition of the regional context but rather active protagonists.

Both Russia and

China have managed

to achieve their goals

in the region without

clashing abrasively

with one another.

The new Great Game that is not, Filippo Costa Buranelli Opinion & Analysis