191Army was already obliged to leave the
German territory. Also, in the summer
of 1991, it left Hungary and Czechoslo-
vakia, which were nonetheless consid-
ered “side fronts”. In Poland, conversely,
we had much stronger forces stationed.
Even more, the Soviet Army that had left
Germany and was trying to return home
had to transfer through Poland and was
doing it without any consultations with
Warsaw. Therefore, Jan Krzysztof Bielec-
ki, who was Poland’s prime minister af-
ter Mazowiecki, made a decision for the
Polish military to halt the Russian col-
umn and allow those who had already
crossed the Vistula River to continue,
while those who had not were turned
back and forced to return to Germany.
Clearly it was impossible to transfer
Russian equipment and vehicles by sea
but the Germans offered eight billion
German marks (German currency at that
time – editor’s note) to the Czechoslo-
vaks in exchange for allowing a transfer
through their territory. This was a very
generous offer but the Czechoslovaks
decided to show their solidarity with the
Poles and rejected it. The Soviets were
thus trapped in Germany and a few days
later had to engage in serious talks with
us, which enabled Poland to negotiate
the departure of the Soviet Army.
This was the first large solidarity-
based activity of the governments that
later formed the Visegrad Group, and
an event that was extremely important
for the functioning of democracy in Po-
land. All in all, the Polish-Czechoslovak
contacts from before 1989 had borne
their fruit.Translated by Iwona ReichardtMirosław Jasiński is a film director, art historian and expert on Polish-Czech relations.
He was a member of the democratic opposition in communist Poland and one
of the leading activists of the underground Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity.Zbigniew Rokita is the managing editor of the Polish
bimonthly magazine Nowa Europa Wschodnia.A friendship that bore fruit, Interviewer: Zbigniew Rokita Poles and Czechs across generations