New Eastern Europe - November-December 2017

(Ben Green) #1
39

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan, there are varying levels of
Islam-inspired activities, some of which
have taken a radical turn. And the gov-
ernments of these Central Asian states
have taken a very resolute anti-Islamic
stance and have been promoting a certain
kind of understanding of “good Islam”
versus “bad Islam”.
“Good Islam” refers to the specific
type of Islam, Muslims, Islamic values
and Islamic identities that these govern-
ments are ready to accept and promote.
Ideologies or ideas that may not neces-
sarily have anything to do with religion,
but are seen as a threat or challenge to
the government, or something that is
not controlled or controllable by the
government, easily get labelled as Islam-
inspired, radical and extremist. So there
is a lot of expedient labelling of differ-
ent kinds of networks, groups and ideas
as extremist or terrorist, which in fact
might not be radical at all.
The governments create and apply
these labels, which may not correspond
to reality. And a lot is being done to un-
dermine any potential for autonomous
organisation of groups and to deny peo-
ple the right to develop identities, ways
of worship, religious interpretations that
they may prefer. The goal of this all is to
maintain control of the regimes and to
eliminate the challenges without enter-
ing into any dialogue or mediation with
the society and the groups concerned.


How do you see the situation in Tajik-
istan where the Islamic Renaissance Party


of Tajikistan was delegalised in 2015? Muhid-
din Kabiri, the party leader who now lives
in exile in Europe, argues that there might
be a growth in Islamic radicalism in Central
Asia as a result of the growing oppression
domestically and the weakening of ISIS in
the Middle East, which can trigger a return
to Central Asia of those people who have
been involved with ISIS. Do you agree with
his diagnosis?
I agree broadly with this statement.
The Islamic Renaissance Party is a well-
known political party and for some time
it did enjoy significant support. But this
party is by no means the main repre-
sentative of Islamic voices in Tajikistan.
There are other groups and movements
in place and there is no one organised,
centralised Islamic leadership.
Going back to the specific point made
by Kabiri, the people fighting for ISIS
represent a number of nations and coun-
tries, not just Tajikistan or Central Asia.
There is a large number of people from
Russia, including Chechens, Dagestan-
is and others, and these far outnumber
ISIS fighters with Central Asian back-
ground. There are also a lot of people
from Western European states, including
a significant number of British Muslims.
The data from 2015 or 2016 show that
there were three to four times more Brit-
ish Muslims fighting for ISIS than Cen-
tral Asians. In addition, there are people
from the Middle East and North Africa
engaged in the fight. So the number of
people from Central Asia or with a Cen-
tral Asian background is a minority of
those who have been recruited. Many of

The complex reality of radicalisation in Central Asia, Interviewer: Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska Opinion & Analysis

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