New Eastern Europe - November-December 2017

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particular aspect of the chosen post-conflict justice modality or modalities. This
is important because the discussed strategies are rarely a single event or process.
It often involves multiple (and sequenced) processes. In particular, one can turn
to the three broad approaches regarding sequencing, as identified by scholars.
These approaches are: truth first, justice later; trials first, truth later; and truth
and justice in tandem.
Whenever decision-makers select a modality of jus post bellum applicable to a
certain conflict, they should bear in mind that it should address a kind of two-level
dilemma: the first (and most fundamental one) is the potential tension between
peace and justice. The applied approach to jus post bellum should first of all pre-
vent the recurrence of violence. Then, establishing justice in itself may require an
even more sophisticated balancing between truth and justice (which is to say, the
restorative and retributive functions of justice must be balanced).

Hybrid complications

The most significant feature of the Donbas conflict that potentially informs a
suitable approach to establishing a jus post bellum modality is its “hybridness”. It
is not our goal to analyse the notion of hybrid warfare in detail; some analysts ar-
gue that the use of the expression hybrid war may be counterproductive in terms
of a proper understanding of the essence of modern conflicts. We understand hy-
bridness primarily as a legal uncertainty regarding the status of the conflict, of the
combatants and fighters taking part in it as well as of relevant political entities re-
sponsible for and able to conduct warfare and implementing peace agreements.
In practical terms, symptoms of hybridness can be grouped into two categories.
First, one can state without exaggeration that on an analytical level there is general
consensus regarding Russia’s active role in the emergence of the para-states of the
“peoples’ republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. On the other hand, Russia is not de
jure in a state of war with Ukraine. It participates in peace talks as an observer or
mediator. At the same time, the existence of a measure of popular support for the
self-proclaimed “republics” also cannot be denied. As a result, one can argue that
the Donbas conflict contains elements of both international and internal conflict.
Second, although in political discourse the Ukrainian authorities widely refer
to the conflict as inter-state war, martial law was never introduced in Ukraine nor
was there ever an official declaration of war. All of the operations undertaken by
Ukraine’s armed forces take place in the framework of a counter-terrorist opera-
tion. Nevertheless, a number of legal measures introduced by the Ukrainian au-
thorities since March 2014 suggest that Ukraine is in a situation which is mate-

Opinion & Analysis Is it too early to speak about justice in Donbas?, Gerhard Kemp and Igor Lyubashenko
Free download pdf