China_Report_Issue_51_August_2017

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boundary.”
In response to In-
dia’s concerns that
China’s activities in the
Doklam region pose
a security threat to its
vulnerable Siliguri Cor-
ridor, a 20km wide
corridor known as the
“Chicken’s Neck” that
links its northeastern
region to the Indian
mainland, Luo said
that “India cannot en-
croach upon the terri-
tory of other countries
on the grounds of its
‘security concerns’ ...
Otherwise, the world
would be in chaos.”
In a statement released on June 30, In-
dia’s Ministry of External Affairs offered its
own narrative of the dispute. Without deny-
ing India’s action in the Doklam region, the
statement made no direct counter argument
to China’s interpretation of the Sikkim-Tibet
border, nor did it reject the validity of the
Anglo-China Convention of 1890.
Instead, New Delhi argued that the issue
was a trilateral matter, involving not only In-
dia and China, but Bhutan as well. Citing a
brief statement released by Bhutan’s Foreign
Affairs Ministry, which claimed that China’s
road construction was “inside Bhutanese
territory” and that it violated agreements
between Bhutan and China to maintain the
status quo in border areas, India argued that
its actions were taken on behalf of Bhutan.
Beijing later responded that its road con-
struction is in areas that are “totally under the
jurisdiction of China” and “on the Chinese
side of the China-Bhutan traditional cus-


tomary line,” which is neither a breach of the
agreement nor damages the status quo.

Bhutan’s Role
Although Bhutan was referred to as a ma-
jor stakeholder in the border dispute, the
leadership in Thimphu has been rather quiet
as Beijing and New Delhi exchanged mutual
accusations. Other than the brief statement
cited by New Delhi, Thimphu has made no
further comments on the issue. For example,
Thimphu didn’t clarify whether it was con-
sulted by India before its troops crossed the
border, which New Delhi said yes but Beijing
said no.
According to Wangcha Sangley, a political
analyst based in Thimphu, as a small king-
dom caught between its two giant neigh-
bours, Bhutan was in an impossible position
to make decisions based on its own interests.
Bhutan has long been dependent on India
both economically, politically and diplomati-
cally. A Buddhist Kingdom with strong ties

with Tibet, Bhutan be-
came a protectorate of
Great Britain in 1910,
and of India after In-
dia’s independence in


  1. In 1949, Bhu-
    tan signed a friendship
    treaty with India that
    required Bhutan’s ex-
    ternal relations to be
    “guided” by India.
    In a widely-cited
    blog post, Sangley said
    India had tried to deal
    with China regard-
    ing the Bhutan-China
    border demarcation in
    the 1960s and 1970s,
    and it was as a result
    of China’s insistence to deal with Bhutan
    directly that India allowed Bhutan to have
    direct border talks with China in the 1980s,
    though India was kept in the loop by Bhutan
    in the process.
    Since then, China and Bhutan have con-
    ducted 24 rounds of annual border talks and
    no formal agreement has been reached so far.
    According to China’s Foreign Ministry, the
    two sides have “a basic consensus on the situ-
    ation on the ground in the border areas and
    the boundary alignment,” but neither China
    nor Bhutan have released details of the talks.
    In an article published on January 1, 2013,
    Govinda Rizal, a contributing editor to the
    Bhutan News Service, said that during the
    10th border talks held in 1996, China of-
    fered to give up its claim to 495 square kilo-
    metres of disputed territories in the north of
    Bhutan in exchange for 269 square kilome-
    tres of territory in the Doklam region in west
    Bhutan. Rizal said the BBC initially reported
    that Bhutan had accepted the proposal, but


s PECIAL REPORT


An Indian army convoy moves towards the border in Pangong, a disputed territory
between India and China, Ladakh, Indian-administered Kashmir, August 2, 2012

Photo by Yawar Nazir / vcg
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