The EconomistJanuary 20th 2018 59
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1
P
ERHAPS the most vexing thing for those
watchingthe oil industry isnot the
whipsawing price of a barrel. It is the con-
stant updating oftheories to explain what
lies behind it. In March 2014, when the
price of a barrel of Brent crude was in three
figures, the then boss of Chevron, an oil
giant, observed that the scarcity of cheap
oil meant “$100 per barrel is becoming the
new $20”. Two yearslater, when the oil
price slumped below $28, the talk was of a
global oil glut caused by the furious efforts
of the OPECcartel to regain market share.
Now that oil prices have tested $70, an-
alysts are again scratching their heads.
In “1984”, George Orwell coined the
term “doublethink”, the ability to believe
two contradictory things. Oil analysis
seems to require similar cognitive gymnas-
tics. Three big questions arise. First, why
has the oil price more than doubled in the
space of two years, against all expectation?
Second, why has this surge been met with
cheers from global stockmarkets and not
concern for the world economy? Lastly,
where might the oil price eventually settle?
Start with the journey to $70. The
slump in prices two years ago was in part a
response to weak demand—with the fragil-
ity of China’s economy a big concern—and
in part to abundant supply. Few believed
then thatOPECwould, or even could, cut
output. Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest
oil exporter, appeared to have every rea-
son not to. Plentiful oil supply would check
It is still surprising they have risen so far.
Higher prices are often blamed in part on
the messy politics of the Middle East. The
usual worries are there but “there has been
no impact on physical supply,” says Mar-
tijn Rats of Morgan Stanley. Shale was also
seen as the oil industry’s flexible response
to price signals. Too high, and the wildcat-
ters in Texas would drill for fresh supply.
But small producers are showing a new re-
straint, because their financiers want great-
er focus on profits and less on output. And
it takes several months from drilling wells
for oil to come on-stream.
The financial markets show little sign of
anxiety about the oil-price surge. Stock-
markets remain buoyant, which is itself
anotherpuzzle. Since the oil shocks of the
1970s, markets have associated a sudden
run-up in oil prices with economic calami-
ty. The world is both producer and con-
sumer of oil, so in principle the overall ef-
fect of oil-price increases is neutral. But in
practice, the net impact had been to reduce
global demand, because oil exporters in
the Middle East tended to save a big chunk
of the windfall income they gained at the
the growth of the shale-oil industryin
North America. It would also stymie Iran,
its bitter rival, which was back in the mar-
ket following the lifting of sanctions.
Yet demand recovered quickly. China
pepped up its economy with faster credit
growth and other fillips to spending. Com-
modity prices surged. Within months clear
signs of a broad-based global economic
upswing were palpable. And OPECproved
better able to curb production than anyone
had imagined. A deal reached in Novem-
ber 2016 to restrict output had little imme-
diate effect but by late last year started to
pay off. Oil stocks fell, notably in America
(see left-hand chart). Demand was out-
stripping supply. Prices duly rose.
The oil price
Crude thinking
High oil prices are mostly a reflection of a healthy global economy, not a threat to it
Finance and economics
Also in this section
60 Buttonwood: Hedge funds
61 Downward digital currencies
62 The Big Mac index
62 A wobble at the World Bank
63 State venture-capital in France
64 Free exchange: Driverless cars and
congestion
Stocks and shares
Sources: IMF; EIA
Crude oil
United States, stocks, barrels, bn External breakeven price, 2016, $ per barrel
0 20406080100
Kazakhstan
Libya
Algeria
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Kuwait
Iraq
UAE
2009 11 13 15 18 Iran
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25