The Economist Asia - 27.01.2018

The Economist January 27th 2018 BriefingAmerica and North Korea 19

2 doves, with each taking a different view of

the utility of talks. A clearer divide turns on

relative optimism or pessimism about Mr

Kim’s intentions, with Mr McMaster a

leading voice of doom (he has compared

this moment of geopolitical peril to 1914).

In particular, pessimists doubtNorth Ko-

rea’s claim that it wants nuclear weapons

that can hit America for self-defence.

Undeterred?

Logic, and Mr Kim’s own words, point to a

nuclear programme with grander ambi-

tions, perhaps to “drive the US from the

peninsula” or reunify Korea under the

North’s flag, argues the senior administra-

tion official. “Why should a regime starve a

couple of million of its own people to

death, expose itself to punishing sanctions,

[and] allow itself to be isolated by all its

friends, merely to gain a deterrent that they

already had for 60 years, from artillery

pieces pointed at Seoul?”

Several officials and ex-officials who

see the value of frightening Mr Kim to the

negotiating table hope privately that Mr

Trump is bluffing, believing that a limited

strike would risk massive retaliation. Even

narrowly-focused operations North of the

border are deemed risky. In late 2016 Mr

Obama’s National Security Council organ-

ised a war game, asking military, dip-

lomatic and intelligence officials to simu-

late a mission to secure nuclear weapons

in a North Korea tumbling into instability.

Participants call the exercise deeply so-

bering, with so many American troops

needed to secure the large number of nuc-

lear sites that it could take months to build

them up, losing any element of surprise,

and raising seemingly insuperable ques-

tions about when to evacuate Americans

from the region without triggering chaos.

An unclassified lettersent by the Pentagon

to Congress in November 2017 offered the

assessment that only a ground invasion

could find and secure all weapons sites.

A senior American official recalls being

asked by foreign counterparts why Mr Kim

could not simply be killed. In reply he

would point to the outside world’s danger-

ous lack of knowledge about what orders

the leader’s death might trigger: “We seri-

ously don’t know that there isn’t some sort

of automatic doomsday process that pulls

down the pillars of the temple.” The same

official asked military colleagues for

“horse’s head on the pillow” options that

would terrify Mr Kim without triggering a

full-scale response. “Nobody I spoke to in

the militaryhad an idea thatcould reliably

thread the needle,” he says.

Scenarios for limited strikes could in-

clude the shooting down of a North Kore-

an ballistic missile test. But a failure would

damage the credibility of American de-

fences. There is also a dangerous paradox

attached to any action launched on the

grounds that North Korea is deemed deaf

to reason, notes Joseph DeTrani, a former

intelligence officer and commentator for

“The Cipher Brief”, a national-security

website, who is also a semi-official envoy

entrusted with meeting senior North Kore-

an diplomats.

If trust vanishes, North Koreans “may

see an imminent threat coming to them

that is not an imminent threat”, disbeliev-

ing assurances thata strike is limited. In his

experience, the country’s diplomats are

professional and informed about the

world. But that only helps if their advice

reaches core leaders, who also hear from

“hardliners in North Korea [whom] we do

not know,” cautions Mr DeTrani. He dis-

agrees with colleagues (and there are

many) who call Mr Trump’s tweets un-

helpful. On balance itis positive for North

Koreans to hear directly from the president,

he says. They understand bombast.

Optimists note thatAmerica has real

points of leverage, even without force. Mr

Carter urges step-by-step “coercive diplo-

macy”, setting out specific sticks and car-

rots for discrete North Korean actions, from

missile tests to underground nuclear tests.

If China proves incapable of playing a pos-

itive role, he recommends it is “sidelined”.

Several officials say that China’s will-

ingness to toughen sanctions is mostly

about managing America, which is seen as

one of two irresponsible powers, along-

side North Korea, distracting Chinese lead-

ers from their domestic priorities. “The

Chinese are more upset with the North Ko-

reans for waking the American giant,” says

an American official.

China is now enforcingUNtrade em-

bargoes on North Korea more strictly, in

part to ward off American sanctions target-

ing specific Chinese banks and oil traders,

though diplomats still deplore Chinese

“salami-slicing” of each new sanctions

plan. By a process of elimination, China

now backs “pressure that will placate the

Americans without being strong enough

to [make the Kim regime] collapse,” says

the official. Meanwhile, China continues

to argue for America to freeze military exer-

cises and curb deployments of advanced

weapons in Asia. China is always “willing

to bargain away the American military

footprint”, growls a second official.

A final camp combines scepticism

about North Korea’smotives—dismissing

Mr Kim’s claims to need nuclear weapons

as a deterrent—with (relative) optimism

about sanctions. A Western diplomat says

that North Korea believes that, if it can be-

come the only nation with a long-range nu-

clear capability other than America, Brit-

ain, China, France and Russia, it will be

welcomed to an “elite club”, free of all

sanctions, “which is pie in the sky”.

This camp would use North Korea’s

ambitions against it. Daniel Russel, former

assistant secretary of state for East Asian

and Pacific affairs during the Obama era,

shares the pessimists’ belief that North Ko-

rea does not need nuclear weapons for de-

terrence, securing its safety with its ability

to bombard Seoul. Nor does it need mis-

siles—it can already detonate a nuclear de-

vice smuggled into South Korea, even if

that would be suicidal.

Mr Russel argues that the North’s goal is

money and other concessions. If through

sustained sanctions “North Korea is de-

nied the pay-off, the ransom it is seeking, it

hasn’t actually achieved the [right] return

on investment on the nuclear pro-

gramme,” says Mr Russel, now at the Asia

Society. A sense of being squeezed without

reward is spreading discontent among the

elites, he says. “The ability to limit Kim’s

ability to govern, via sanctions, is the best

leverage we have.”

Ironically, given all the focus in Wash-

ington on Mr Trump’s impulsive ways, in-

siders worry most about a crisisthat is

thrust upon him. They fear that China and

North Korea are both waiting Mr Trump

out, hoping that he loses the White House

or become distracted by other crises.

Mutual incomprehension
Mr Denmark speaks for several officials
when expressing dread about Mr Kim mis-
judging some fresh provocation. In 2010
the North sank the Cheonan, a South Kore-
an patrol ship, killing 46 sailors. He fears
Mr Kim trying a similar act today, thinking
that America will not respond. The North
might overreact to American demonstra-
tions of will, such as bomber flights off the
coast, says MrDenmark. “What’s to stop
the North Koreans thinking that’s the be-
ginning of an attack? That keeps me up.
Who has launch authority on the North
Korean side in the middle of the night?”
On the other side stands Mr Trump, a
wild card who may soon face risks he
deems intolerable while lacking any good
options. “The president may be forced to
take action,” a USofficial says. “The poten-
tial for conflict is very high.” 7
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