46 Europe The EconomistJanuary 27th 2018P
ITY the poor European who seeksconsistency. On January
22nd Mike Pence, America’s vice-president, said that the Un-
ited States was on the verge of quitting the nuclear agreement
signed with Iran in 2015. At the same time Rex Tillerson, the secre-
tary of state, was in London expressing optimism that the deal
could be saved with a bit oftinkering. Foreign ministers from
across the European Union were in Brussels that day; the confu-
sion hovered above their conversation like an Amazon drone
bearing either chocolates or dynamite.
Mr Trump’s carnivalesque approach to the presidency has
made life hard for America’s allies, but his first year in office has
not brought forth anything like the full horrors that some predict-
ed. Congress has boxed him in on Russia, NATOdoes not yet tot-
ter and trade wars have failed to break out (although this week
brought worrying news). Even if many Europeans reject Mr
Trump as baffling and odious—just 25% in a recent Gallup survey
express approval of his presidency—the transatlanticbond re-
mains intact.
But the threat to the Iran deal of 2015, now hanging by a thread,
could change all that. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), to give it its full title, is the EU’s signature foreign-policy
achievement (some might say there are few rivals). Three EU
members—Britain, France and Germany—are co-signatories,
along with America, Russia and China. The EUhas a formal role
in overseeing its implementation. The deal eased a security
threat in the Middle East, reduced the likelihood of war between
America and Iran, and represented a triumph for the EU’s pre-
ferred diplomatic method: dogged, law-bound and multilateral.
The EU saw it as a springboard for commercial and cultural en-
gagement with Iran and, though this was never a formal part of
the agreement, a way to bring it in from the geopolitical cold.
Yet on January 12th Mr Trump threatened to reimpose sanc-
tions on Iran within 120 days, thus nullifying America’s participa-
tion in the deal, if Europe failed to fix its “terrible flaws”. Ameri-
can worries with the deal seem to cluster around three issues:
“sunset” clauses after which Iran can ramp up enrichment; Iran’s
ballistic-missile programme; and its mischief-making in Syria, Ye-
men, Lebanon and elsewhere. The Europeans, unusually united
in their defence of the deal, say that its purpose was precisely tohive off nuclear proliferation from broader concerns. But that ar-
gument seems to be losing ground in Washington.
Britain and, especially, France still hope to keep Mr Trump on
board (Germany, without a proper government since September,
is otherwise engaged). Diplomats say they have long leaned on
Iran to curb its ballistic-missile programme. In March France’s for-
eign ministerwill visit Tehran to try to talk the mullahs round; Mr
Macron himself has been invited to Iran. Mr Trump has also be-
stowed his first state-visit invitation upon his French counterpart.
Mr Macron may visit just weeks before Mr Trump is due to make
his final decision on the Iran sanctions, on May 12th.
Mr Trump has left the Europeans in an tight spot, obliged to
side with Russia, China and Iran againsttheir old ally. His threats
to kill the Iran deal have already left it in a “zombie state”, accord-
ing to a new reportpublished byBourse & Bazaar, a website that
promotes trade with Iran. The side-deals Mr Tillerson is pushing
for undermine the Europeans’ strategy of predictability—and
there is no guarantee that they will satisfy Mr Trump (or the Iran
hawks in Congress). Beyond Iran, tensions simmer between the
EU’s instinct for engagement and an American approach that
veers between aggression and unpredictability. This makes for
some awkward conversations in a club that is not yet ready to
consider life without American protection. “Trump highlights the
strategic dilemma of the Europeans in a way that is very uncom-
fortable for them,” says Jan Techau, an analyst at the German
Marshall Fund in Berlin.
How should they proceed? Mr Trump’s administration is
clearly split on Iran. European efforts to rescue the deal would
strengthen the hand of the square-jawed generals around Mr
Trump who do not wish to antagonise America’s allies or em-
bolden Iran’s hardliners. Yet Mr Trump has resisted pressure from
his advisers before, as with his decision to withdraw from the Par-
is climate deal. He may well do so again.
Many argue that the Europeans therefore need contingency
plans. America’sbiggest weapon is not reimposing its own sanc-
tions on Iran, but slapping punitive measures on European firms
and banks that do business there. Ellie Geranmayeh of the Euro-
pean Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, suggests that the
Europeans should work hard with Congress to seek exemptions
from such “secondary sanctions”; if that fails, she says they
should threaten countervailing sanctions on American invest-
ments in Europe. Others might well argue that a tit-for-tat trade
war will do no one any good.Europe help thyself
The American security guarantee remains indispensable; the
primary task for policymakers on both sidesof the Atlantic must
always be to lessen divisions, not to accelerate a divorce. The best
way to do that would be for Europe to spend more on its own de-
fence, undercutting those in Washington, Mr Trump included,
who see the EU as a free-rider. But Europe can practise some pru-
dent insurance, too, working to develop its own nascent security
co-operation, so long as that does not divert resources away from
NATO. Mr Trump is especially erratic, but Europeans cannot sim-
ply assume that his successor will restore business as usual. It is
only sensible forthem to gird themselves for a world in which
their interests may align a bit less often with America’s, whoever
is in charge. Mr Trump, after all, won the presidency while hold-
ing its foreign-policy establishment in disdain. Thatlesson will
not be lost in America; and nor should it be in Europe. 7Torn over Tehran
Splits overthe Iran nuclear deal are testing the transatlantic bondCharlemagne
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