The Economist Asia - 03.02.2018

20 BriefingEuropean populism The Economist February 3rd 2018

2 normally or go away”. In 2016 Theresa

May, his British counterpart, rallied her

party by attacking “citizens of nowhere”

who “find yourpatriotism distasteful, your

concerns about immigration parochial,

your views about crime illiberal, your at-

tachment to your job security inconve-

nient” in a speech that could have come

from UKIP. In December France’s Republi-

cans chose as their leader Laurent Wau-

quiez, a Eurosceptic opposed to gay mar-

riage who wants immigration reduced to

“a strict minimum” and plans to make his

party “truly right-wing”. New Democracy

in Greece and GERBin Bulgaria, facing

competition from the extreme-right Gold-

en Dawn and Zankina parties respectively,

have taken tougher lines on immigrants

and other out groups.

In Germany the notionally liberal Free

Democrats have called for most refugees to

be sent back eventually. In Angela Merkel’s

Christian Democrats (CDU) there is talk of

a more assertive German “lead culture”

and a stronger sense of “homeland”,

which may indicate the party’s direction

when Mrs Merkel steps down. At the annu-

al gathering in January of the Christian So-

cial Union, the CDU’s Bavarian sister party,

Mr Orbán was a guest of honour. Alex-

ander Dobrindt, a CSUgrandee, demand-

ed a “conservative revolution” against Ger-

many’s metropolitan minority.

One rationale for such cosying up is

that it denies the populists exclusive own-

ership of sensitive issues such as identity,

thus allowing reasonable voters to whom

such issues matter an alternative not

tinged with extremism. But in “The Euro-

pean Mainstream and the Populist Radical

Right”, a new book, Pontus Odmalm and

Eve Hepburn of the University of Edin-

burgh conclude that there is “no immedi-

ate pattern” suggesting thatthe availability

of mainstream alternatives to the populist

right weakens their electoral performance.

Mr van Spanje’s analysis suggests that

imitating populist insurgents only weak-

ens them in the rare cases where they are

also ostracised. Pointing to the dynamic

betweenUKIPand Britain’s Conservatives

before the Brexit referendum, Tim Bale of

Queen Mary University of London ob-

serves that “the centre right often primes

the electorate for the radical right’s messa-

ge...helping it to take off and then, in an at-

tempt to counter its appeal by talking even

tougher, simply makes that message even

more salient and further boosts its appeal.”

Meanwhile, on the left, social demo-

cratic parties are adopting whatJohn Judis,

an American journalist, calls “dyadic pop-

ulism”. Insurgent populism often boasts

three ideological players: the people, the

elite, and the “other” (foreigners, immi-

grants, welfare spongers and the like) to

whom the elite has sold the people out.

Thus it is “triadic”. The dyadic version has

no nefarious third party, just an us-and-

them world where a corrupt capitalist po-

litical caste has betrayed the proletariat for

its own benefit. Under Jeremy Corbyn, a

68-year-old from the party’s hard left, Brit-

ain’s Labour Party went into the 2017 elec-

tion calling British politics a “cosy cartel”

and a “rigged system set up by the wealth

extractors, for the wealth extractors”. Mar-

tin Schulz, the SPD’s centrist leader, sought

to protect his working-class flank in last

year’s election by railing against bankers in

“mirrored skyscrapers”.

Another way to get populist politics

and policies without populist govern-

ments is to hold referendums. In 2013

Dutch populists keenly supported a law

enabling any piece of primarylegislation

to be put directly to the country’s12.9m vot-

ers if 300,000 of them demanded it. In

Greece the Syriza government used a refer-

endum to reject the conditions of a bail-out

by international institutions. In Britain the

referendum on Brexit—the fulfilment of a

long-standingUKIPdemand—compelled

almostthe entire political class to adopt a

policy confined until recently to its popu-

list fringes. Austria’s coalition agreement

opens the door to more plebiscites; so,

more tentatively, does the preliminary

blueprint for a newCDU/SPDcoalition in

Germany. In Italy the M5Smanifesto prom-

ises to give the people opportunities to

vote on which laws to scrap.

Trilingualism against the triadics

Not all mainstreamers are parroting popu-

list positions. The surge of what Mr Müller

calls “illiberal democracy” has produced a

backlash. The confidently pro-European,

pluralist politics of Mr Macron and his En

Marche! party is one instance. Another is

the centrist Ciudadanos (“Citizens”) party

now leading the polls in Spain. Its leader’s

slogan is “Catalonia is my land, Spain my

country and Europe is our future”—the first

phrase spoken in Catalan, the second in

Spanish, the third in English. Other new

parties—Modern in Poland, Momentum in

Hungary and NEOSin Austria—match the

populists’ enterprise and presentational

swagger while fighting their world view. As

yet, though, they remain small.

It looks likely they will grow, but so will

the sway of the populists. For a glimpse of

what that may mean look at the conti-

nent’s last generation of political entrants:

Green parties. Originally scrappy, over

time they became more professional and

started to join local and sometimes even

national governments. None has ever led a

European country alone, but their influ-

ence is felt in the attention now paid to

green transport, recycling, renewable ener-

gy and certain civic liberties (particularly

sexual freedoms).

What if the populistsare as successful

in the next few years? One might expect

more authoritarian law-and-order poli-

cies, burqa bans, greater opposition to mul-

tilateral bodies like the EU, NATOand the

WTO,and greater sympathy for Russia (an

affection held across the populist spec-

trum, from Syriza to Fidesz by way of M5S).

Expect, too, frequent referendums, less

well integrated immigrants, more polar-

ised political debates and more demagogic

leaders emoting directly to and on behalf

of their devoted voters.

Populists do notneed to win elections

to enact their policies and spread their

style of politics. They can do so through the

very mainstream parties whose votes they

threaten to take; infecting them and living

off their political blood. “Eventually,”

warns Mr Bale, “the parasite may end up

consuming the host.” 7

NETH.

CZECH REP.

LITHUANIA

DENMARK

HUNGARY

BULGARIA

ROMANIA

CROATIA

SLOV.

BELGIUM

LUX.

GERMANY

UKRAINE

TURKEY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

BELARUS

NORWAY

ESTONIA

IRELAND

BRITAIN

POLAND

GREECE CYPRUS

FRANCE AUST.

SLOVAKIA

LATVIA RUSSIA

SPAIN

PORTUGAL

ITALY

Source: Foundation for European Progressive Studies

Political family

of populist parties

Populist parties

in EU countries

Popularity among

likely voters

End of 2016, %

40-

30-

50+

20-

10-

0-

Right

Centrist/

big tent

Left