The EconomistFebruary 3rd 2018 43For daily analysis and debate on Europe, visit
Economist.com/europe1A
NXIETIES about Donald Trump’s com-
mitment to NATOand Russia’smili-
tary assertiveness remain at the top of the
alliance’s agenda. But close behind looms
the problem of semi-detached Turkey, a
country that not only possessesNATO’s
second-biggestarmed force, but also strad-
dles a critical geopolitical fault-line be-
tween west and east.
Turkey is not only unpredictable. It also
pursues a nationalist agenda that can put it
at odds with its obligations to allies. The
most recent source of tension is the sim-
mering row between Turkey and America
over Turkey’s incursion into Afrin, a Kurd-
ish enclave in north-west Syria. This is not,
strictly speaking, a matter forNATO. How-
ever, American troops could soon find
themselves under direct attack from their
NATOally if Turkey’s president, Recep Tay-
yip Erdogan, carries out a promise to
“strangle...before it is born” a 30,000-
strong American-backed “border security
force”, composed largely ofYPGKurdish
fighters whom Turkey regards as terrorists.
Mr Erdogan probably calculates that he
can face down America, which is less inter-
ested in the region than he is. He may be
right, but clashing interests in Syria are
only one element in Turkey’s troubled rela-
tionship with NATOmembers. Well before
an attempted coup in the summer of 2016,
there were growing concerns within NATO
about Turkey’s drift towards authoritarian-After an intervention byNATO’s civilian
chief, Jens Stoltenberg, the Turks eventual-
ly allowed the lawmakers access to the
AWAC Screws at Konya. But the Germans
still moved their Tornados from Incirlik to
Muwaffaq Salti, an air base in Jordan
which America is expanding, at a cost of
$143m, as an insurance policy in case they
need to leave Incirlik.
The warmth of Turkey’s relations with
Russia, particularly since the coup, is an-
other worry. Mr Erdogan looks to his oppo-
site number in the Kremlin as the man to
do business with in Syria. He sees in him a
strong and purposeful leader like himself.
By cosying up to Mr Putin, he sends a mes-
sage to NATOthat he has other options.
From Mr Putin’s point of view, Mr Erdogan
gives him a means of dividing and weak-
eningNATOand the West, which is his
overriding strategic objective.Red on blue
The most flagrant demonstration of Mr Er-
dogan’s Janus-faced foreign policy was the
announcement in December that Turkey
has signed an agreement to purchase two
batteries of advanced S-400 surface-to-air
missiles from Russia. The S-400 system
cannot be integrated with NATOair-de-
fence systems and, at least at first, will be
set up and operated by Russians. Unless
Turkey is frozen out ofNATOinformation-
sharing on countermeasures aimed at de-
feating the S-400, Russia can expect a
windfall of intelligence.
Most worrying, Turkey is a partner in
the F-35 programme and is due to take de-
livery of 116 of the stealthy fighter jets that
will be the mainstay ofNATO’s combat air
capability for the next 30 years. Turkey will
be in a unique position to hone the S-400
against theF-35, knowledge that Russia
may well take advantage of. Some nation-ism. In the aftermath of the botched coup,
those fears have intensified. Mr Erdogan,
resentful of what he took to be insincere ex-
pressions of support from the West (in con-
trast with Vladimir Putin’s full-throated
congratulations), has embarked on a brutal
purge of anyone suspected of disloyalty.
Among the 50,000 arrested and 110,000
dismissed from their jobs for supposed
links with the exiled cleric, Fethullah Gu-
len (regarded as the plotter-in-chief), are
about 11,000 military officers and pilots.
According to one Turkish military ana-
lyst, 38% of Turkey’s generals were sacked.
Many were singled out for being pro-West-
ern secularists. Some 400 Turkish military
envoys to NATOwere fired and ordered
home—many fled abroad rather than face
jail—to be replaced by less qualified Erdo-
gan loyalists, some of whom are actively
hostile to NATOand sympathetic to its ad-
versaries. General Curtis Scaparrotti, the
alliance’s supreme commander, has com-
plained of “degradation” in staff quality.
In another episode, German MPswere
last year(not for the first time) refused per-
mission to visitGerman air crews flying
support missions into Iraq from two bases
in Turkey, Incirlik and Konya. It looked like
punishment after Germany had banned
Mr Erdogan’s supporters from holding ral-
lies on its soil in support of his campaign to
extend the powers of the presidency. (He
called the ban a return to “Nazi practices”.)Turkey and NATOAn unhappy marriage
Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems happy to put Turkey on a collision course with NATOEurope
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