The Economist Asia - 03.02.2018

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44 Europe The EconomistFebruary 3rd 2018


2

T

HEY like their food in Modena, a city
on the foggy flatlands south of the Riv-
er Po that gave the world the Ferrari, Lu-
ciano Pavarotti and a restaurant, the Oste-
ria Francescana, that was voted the best in
Europe last year. As people gathered for a
fundraisingdinner in the suburb of San
Damaso, a delectable aroma wafted
through the sports hall where it was to be
served. And among the pleasures it beto-
kened was the sweet taste of revenge.
The dinner was for a new party, Liberi e
Uguali (Free and Equal, orLeU), founded
last year bypoliticians who had left Matteo
Renzi’s governing, centre-left Democratic
Party (PD). Some of the rebels objected to
his business-friendly policies; others com-
plained of his ruthless marginalisation of
the party’s old guard, including the night’s
main speaker, Pier Luigi Bersani, who led
the PD until 2013. Mr Bersani insists his dif-
ferences with Mr Renzi are political. “He

has taken the PD—myPD—torn out its roots,
and taken it elsewhere,” he says as he waits
to take the platform.
The PD traces those roots to the once
mighty Italian Communist Party (PCI),
which for almost 40 years was the main
opposition party to the now-also-defunct
Christian Democrats. A merger between
those, like Mr Bersani, who belonged to the
PCIand a smaller group of progressives
who left it as it imploded, including Mr
Renzi, became the PD. Proclaiming himself
il rottamatore(“the demolition man”), Mr
Renzi has sidelined PD worthies of all
stripes, but particularly ex-communists.
The list of candidates for Italy’s general
election which he unveiled on January
27th showed that he had set aside around
80% of winnable seats for his followers.
Mr Bersani claimed, and seniorPD offi-
cials privately concede, that his successor’s
true goal after the vote on March 4th is a co-
alition with Silvio Berlusconi’s conserva-
tive Forza Italia party—if, as looks probable,
no party or alliance wins an outright ma-
jority. But Mr Renzi’s chances of being a
kingmaker in the talks after the ballot, and
perhaps even of surviving as party leader,
depend on the PD’s performance. The au-
guries are not good. Polls have recorded a
steady decline in its support from a peak of
more than 40% in mid-2014 to around 23%.
The LeUsplit has not helped.
The PD’s decline seems an odd reward
for the dominant partner in a government
presiding over a (modest) economic reviv-
al after years of crisis. Italy’sGDP grew by
an annual 1.7% in the third quarter, spurred
by rising exports and, even more encourag-
ingly, rising internal demand and foreign
investment. Under Mr Renzi, who resigned
as prime minister last year to be succeeded
by Paolo Gentiloni, a labour reform was
passed that has since helped to create
around a million jobs (though too many of
them involve short-term contracts).
A seniorPD official points to two causes
of the party’s decline: a perception that it is

not in control of immigration and the split
in its ranks, which is as much about Mr
Renzi’s autocratic style as about policy. Mr
Bersani reckons the LeU could achieve
double its current poll showing of 6-7%. But
he denies that it is stealing votes from the
PD. Its message, he says, woos disenchant-
ed supporters of the anti-establishment
Five Star Movement and voters who
would otherwise abstain. Buthe acknowl-
edges that it also appeals to a third group:
“people who have been votingPD without
conviction”. There seemed to be plenty in
the hall in San Damaso. “Renzi doesn’t lis-
ten to anyone,” said Tiziana Bassoli, a
housewife. “He has to understand we’re
not just going to sit here and listen to him.”
In places like Modena, where the left
has been in office continuously since 1946,
the disputes that have splitthe left have di-
vided families, soured friendships and
caused Davide Fava, the PD’s provincial
secretary, weary, incredulous despair. The
surrounding region of Emilia-Romagna
was once among the poorest in Europe, he
recalls. It grew rich because its inhabitants
pulled together in a way that made them
naturally receptive to the PCI’s pragmatic
version of communism. His grandfather,
who had been “happy to eat one meal a
day”, had joined other local shopkeepers
to form an association that gave them le-
verage over their suppliers. Today, it is one
of Italy’sbiggest supermarket chains.
“I have difficulty understanding the rea-
soning behind this split,” he says. “We are
divided over issues that make no sense.”
And he scoffs at the claim that Free and
Equal will not damage the Democrats. “In
the current situation, losing 1% is damag-
ing,” he says. “My fear is that it will let in a
right that has alreadyshown itself unable
to govern Italy.” 7

Italy

Demolition of the


demolition man


MODENA
The ruling party is struggling as the
election nears

Democrats in decline

Sources: National polls; The Economist

Italy, general election polling
Selected candidates, %

MJ J ASOND
2017

J
2018

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35
Di Maio (Five Star Movement)

Renzi (Democratic Party)

Berlusconi (Forza Italia)

Salvini (Northern League)

Grasso (Free and Equal)

Meloni (Brothers of Italy)

Renzi approaches breaking point

al-security commentators in America ar-
gue that Turkey should either cancel the
S-400 or be told it cannot buy the F-35. The
resulting confrontation could lead to Tur-
key marching out ofNATO.
NATOofficials are doing their best to
put on a brave face. They point out that Tur-
key has also signed a deal with Eurosam, a
European consortium building air-defence
missiles, and that the S-400 maybe just a
stopgap. They also say that, in other ways,
it is business as usual. Turkey is fulfilling its
commitments to the alliance, for example
by guarding Kabul airport and doing noth-
ing to hinder a NATO-EU security agree-
ment, which it could have blocked. There is
sympathy, too, for Turkey’s vulnerability to
terrorism and praise for the refugee burden
it has borne. And even if there were a
mechanism for suspending or expelling
Turkey from NATO, which there is not (al-
though its tarnished democratic creden-
tials would prevent it joining the alliance
as a new member), its geopolitical impor-
tance is as great as ever.
The hope is that Mr Erdogan knows that
Russia is using Turkeyfor its own purposes,
and that it is no substitute forNATOas a
long-term security partner. It ispossible,
too, that his post-coup paranoia will abate,
although there is little sign of it. But as with
many unhappy marriages, the reality is
that—however fraughttheir relationship—
Turkey and NATOhave little choice but to
try to make it work. 7
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