Era of Epistemological Equity 39
acknowledged the need for theoretical pluralism. This is relevant for deaf epistemol-
ogies because diverse philosophies of the various weltanschauung reflect on the social
construction of scientific practice.oBJECTIvISM AnD RELATIvISM
Situating knowledge production in a cultural, social, political, and historical con-
text is often discussed as a form of cognitive relativism; this differs from objectiv-
ism, which seeks universals (see Moores & Paul, 2012). Pinxten (1991) distinguishes
between a traditional objectivism and a more recent (post-Kantian) objectivism:
Whereas traditional objectivism refers to an ontological foundation for the evalua-
tion of statements about the world, post-Kantian objectivism situates the foundation
for statements of truth in the theoretical consensus that scientists have reached.
Pinxten distinguishes four versions of relativism:- Kuhn’s conception of the incommensurability of paradigms. Because we do not have
a universal language of observation, facts are theory-laden (see also Wang,
2012). - Science is conducted from within a weltanschauung (see Suppe, 1977).
- Worldviews and theories are relativistic. Underneath these superficial differences,
an a priori criterion of universality (including truth and logic) provides
cross-cultural understanding. Barnes (cited in Pinxten, 1991) states that this
universal foundation cannot be found in truth or rationality; rather it can be
found in “an unproblematic baseline of normality” (p. 184). This is problem-
atic because the concept of what is normal is relativistic. - Science may have cultural components (Pinxten, 1991; see also Elzinga & Jamison,
1981; needham, 1965). values of the sociocultural context in which science
is produced constitute knowledge production and need to be taken into
account in the study of epistemic practices.
Perelman and olbrechts-Tyteca (1957) found that speakers in philosophy of science
focus on a universal audience, presenting rational and universal statements of truth.
In sociological terms, a particular philosophical and scientific audience is identified
as universal (standing for humankind), and a priori knowledge and “hard facts” are
claimed to be true or highly probable. Calling these claims of objectivity and univer-
sality into question, Kuhn’s relativistic stance shocked scientific traditions.
For ontological objectivists, there is correspondence between reality and the state-
ment of truth; that is, critics need to be convinced that abstract values are well founded.
Epistemological ontologists refer to a set of a priori statements (a theory). The relativ-
ists whom I have discussed here all deal with epistemological issues and, as such, do
not argue against realism. The second and third versions of relativism advanced by
Pinxten (1991) focus on the type of correspondence theory. The first version (Kuhn’s
incommensurability) focuses on the question of whether we should share consistency
as a value in order to be a universal audience. The fourth version explores the question