Deaf Epistemologies, Identity, and Learning

(Sean Pound) #1

40 Deaf Epistemologies, Identity, and Learning


of an overarching set of values: “In what sense is science a cultural phenomenon (local
knowledge), and if it is, how can universal truths be conceived?” (Pinxten, 1991, p. 189).
Pinxten concludes that none of the relativists actually argue against realism (i.e.,
ontological objectivism). ontological objectivism and epistemological relativism
discuss different things, and as such are not mutually exclusive. Rather, there are
“gradual diversifications” (Pinxten, 1991, p. 189): Lukes’s infrastructural basis of
rationalism includes some objectivism, Kuhn’s incommensurability and critique do
not relinquish objectivity, and the weltanschauung views diverse knowledge traditions
as being different but sharing the same rationality.
The epistemological argument of the present chapter is situated in this fourth
version of cognitive relativism. From the description and comparison of diverse
knowledge systems, “an empirical foundation for a possible relativistic epistemology
(of the fourth type)” may emerge that will be accepted as “an a posteriori basis for
the universals for an objectivist epistemology” (Pinxten, 1991, p. 191):
We are able to communicate and interact with each other in order to arrive at
some common understanding regarding the way we see and think about the
world: about the limits and constraints on well-founded or dependable knowl-
edge; perhaps even about “good” (i.e., commonly cherished) ways to use it.
This perspective on relativism is a heuristic epistemological process. Science is now
localized “as a way of thinking and acting in the very broad context of one or more
civilizations” (Pinxten & note, 2005, p. 95).
The situatedness of science affects both the status and the contents of the knowl-
edge that is produced. Social factors grant more authority to certain scholars, which
may influence whether a certain theory is more acceptable than another (Bourdieu
1990, 1998; see also Addelson, cited in Tanesini, 1999). For example, deaf scholars
experience bias toward their work and have limited opportunities to conduct re-
search. Standard views of knowledge may perceive the concept of deaf epistemolo-
gies as revolutionary and not open for critique and discussion. Deaf scholars, Third
World criticism, and Third World deaf scholars are still scarce in the field.
Moores and Paul argue that the different positions of standard epistemology and
d/Deaf epistemologies can be placed on “a continuum with a potentially infinite
number of possibilities” (2010, p. 494; see also Moores & Paul, 2012). Consideration
of this discussion, as well as from analyses of feminist epistemologies (e.g., Code,
2006; Davis, Evans, & Lorber, 2006; Tanesini, 1999), a field in which metatheorizing
has been further developed, raises the question of whether there is an endless range
of possible positions in d/Deaf epistemologies. Further metatheorizing in the field
will bring more clarity on these positions.

DEAF EPISTEMoLoGIES AS A CRITIQUE AnD ALTERnATIvE
To THE PRACTICE oF SCIEnCE
Stokoe, Casterline, and Croneberg’s (1965) Dictionary of American Sign Language on Lin-
guistic Principles legitimized American Sign Language (ASL) as a bona fide language.
Drawing on the fields of structural comparative linguistics and anthropology, the
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