The Economist June 9th 2018 BriefingDonald Trump and the world 212 Centre shows them evenly divided be-
tween those who want their country to be
active in world affairs and those who say it
should concentrate on problems at home.
The share of those favouring foreign activ-
ism has actually been rising, from 35% in
2014 to 47% last year. In 2016, 3m more vot-
ers chose Mrs Clinton, a much more inter-
nationalist, foreign-policy consensualist,
than Mr Trump. This, though, is a one-term
argument. If, seeing what he has wrought,
America chooses Mr Trump again in 2020,
the evidence for a decisive turn will be
much stronger.
That leaves the biggest “Yes, but” of all:
that the international system, somewhat
ossified, faces a new world for which it was
not designed. Both the astonishing rise of
China’s economic power and, more recent-
ly, its increased authoritarianism at home
and assertiveness abroad under Xi Jinping,
mark deep shifts in geopolitics. With India
coming along behind, Europe looking trou-
bled, and risks from climate chaos too, the
changes seem set to continue.
For many experts, this is a reason to
strengthen today’s structure. But the idea
that the old world order is not a good fit for
the current and coming world can also be
taken as meaning that a little creative de-
struction might helpfully broaden minds
and reshape institutions.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to
think that Mr Trump’s destructive efforts
will lend themselves to any creative after-
math. They have the consistent effect of
weakening core alliances and alienating
neighbours. “It’s no longer the case that the
United States will simply just protect us,”
the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, ac-
knowledged last month. As yet, none of
America’s Western allies has found any
way of getting concessions from Mr Trump.
If most of America’s allies (which Mr
Trump often refers to as competitors) are
unhappy, its real strategic competitors, Rus-
sia and China, are making hay. The weaker
the West, the less threatened Russia feels,
and the more it sees a chance of encourag-
ing European countries to break with the
sanctions that hurt its economy; Italy, un-
der its new government, is a tempting tar-
get. The fact that Mr Trump is trying to
thwart efforts to discoverthe degree to
which Russia attempted to undermine his
opponent in the 2016 election doesnot just
add to the distrust with which foreign-poli-
cy people see him. It may also encourage
Russia in similar efforts elsewhere—or, in-
deed, renewed efforts in America.Hold on to your butts
China is startled by how rapidly American
leadership has dwindled. Though Com-
munist Party officials are somewhat wary
of taking on great-power responsibilities,
they see tempting opportunities to portray
China as the defender of world order in
matters such as climate change and trade.
And China knows how to get its way with
Mr Trump, at leaston some things, as the
case ofZTE, a telecoms-equipment com-
pany based in Shenzhen, recently showed.
America punished ZTEfor breaking laws
on Iranian sanctions with a ban on semi-
conductor purchases in the United
Sates—in effect a corporate death-sentence.
China lobbied hard for a reprieve. Chinese
requests for such special favours under Mr
Obama were routinely dismissed by offi-
cials who explained that this was not how
things worked in America, governed by
the rule of law. But Mr Trump publicly or-
dered his government to lift the ban on
May 13th.
The degree to which Mr Trump’s policy
decisions can be influenced by favourable
treatment of the business interests from
which he continues to benefit is not clear. If
they can, it is a fair bet that a number of
countries, including China, will seek such
leverage. On May 10th a state-owned Chi-nese company made a deal with an Indo-
nesian company that is the Trump Organi-
sation’s partner in a large development.
Might the individual, transactional ele-
ments of Mr Trump’s policy add up to
something grander, that might even be
called Trumpism? If so, according to John
Negroponte, a formerambassador and di-
rector of national intelligence, it probably
looks something like this. Build up Ameri-
ca’s economy, freeing it from years of over-
zealous regulation (peace through
strength). Maintain alliances (just about)
and invest heavily in the country’s military
power (peace through might). Use that
strength to make gains in chosen areas
around the world, including in the long
challenge from China.
Mr Trump, some say, would not be the
first American president to be widely de-
rided by the foreign-policy establishment
yet prove surprisingly successful in bring-
ing peace and prosperity. Ronald Reagan
spoke in direct ways no one expected—
“evil empire”—and was ready to intensify
the cold war. He supported a huge deficit-
backed increase in military spending, not
to mention some unsavoury friends in Lat-
in America. He was willing to pick trade
fights and throw America’s weight around.
For all these reasons he was condescended
to and disparaged by all sorts of experts in
his first term. And that was before the ill-
advised, illegal shenanigans of Iran-Con-
tra came to light. Yet the cold war ended,
America got richer, its military forces be-
came more capable and the world-trade
system was liberalised.
But Mr Reagan had values. He was an
eternal optimist, a champion of America
as an example to the world. He possessed a
consistent world view and a moral com-
pass—albeit one that occasionally erred.
He knew stuff; he made notes; he believed
there could be win-win deals. Although
he, too, got through lots of national securi-
ty advisers (six in all), for much of his time
in office he had the consistent support of
exceptional secretaries of state and de-
fence, George Shultz and Caspar Weinber-
ger. And he was lucky in his geopolitical
adversary/partner, Mikhail Gorbachev—a
man now taken by Mr Xi as history’s great-
est example of a precedent not to follow.
The chances of Mr Trump being looked
back on as a latter-day Reagan are nil. The
chances that he might achieve some of his
short-term aims are real. Unfortunately, to
the extent that Mr Trump succeeds, he, his
followers and those of like mind else-
where will feel that their scorn of the rules-
based international order is vindicated,
while continuing to do nothing to find a
durable replacement. They are right that it
is in some ways outdated and inadequate.
They are wrong that it is unnecessary—as a
world of trade wars, nuclear proliferation,
fractured alliances and regional conflict
may soon show. 7