40 Middle East and Africa The EconomistJune 9th 2018
T
HE holy month of Ramadan used to be
an occasion for royal amnesties in Sau-
di Arabia. But instead of granting pardons,
Muhammad bin Salman, the crown prince
and power behind the throne, has added
to the 2,000 or so political prisoners de-
tained since September. Over the past
month his goons have arrested 17 liberal ac-
tivists. Nine are women, some of whom
campaigned for the right to drive.
Prince Muhammad has loosened the
kingdom’s social restrictions. The decades-
old ban on female drivers will be lifted on
June 24th. But when citizens demand new
rights, instead of waiting patiently to be
granted them by royal decree, they are of-
ten locked up. The effect has been stifling.
Before talking politics over the phone, Sau-
dis take precautions, such as using virtual
private networks and encrypted dialling
services. Many have purged their Twitter
accounts or closed them. “Sorry. I’m not
ready to talk,” writes a once-verbose activ-
ist. They are all terrified, says a diplomat.
Prince Muhammad sees no contradic-
tion in all this. His social contract apes that
of the United Arab Emirates, which grants
subjectssocial freedoms provided they for-
go political ones. In less than a year as
crown prince, he has taken direct control of
media outlets and big businesses, or ap-
pointed his men to their boards. Once-
powerful clerics and princely challengers
have been squashed. Gone is talk of hold-
ing elections for the Shura council, a royal-
ly appointed proto-parliament.
The prince has also overhauled the
state security police, recruiting former
Egyptian officers to hound dissidents. Ac-tivists used simply to disappear into custo-
dy. Now they are named and shamed after
being arrested. Photos of female cam-
paigners appear on the frontpages of the
press, stamped in red with the words
“spies”, “traitors” and “agents of embas-
sies”. Twitter bots spread the allegations.
Spyware, delivered as text messages,
combs phones for fresh suspects.
Western firms, skilled in secret psycho-
logical operations, have been hired to help
shape public opinion. They include SCL
Group, the parent company of Cambridge
Analytica, the political-data firm that
claims to have helped President Donald
Trump win election. Before Prince Mu-hammad’s economic- and social-reform
drive, SCLGroup, a British firm, conducted
dozens of focus groups with ordinary Sau-
dis and found evidence of widespread dis-
content with the monarchy. It advised the
regime on how to stay in power.
Prince Muhammad’s strategy of sup-
pressing dissent while loosening up in
some areas appears calculated. He has
made many enemies by sidelining fellow
royals, shaking down businessmen, lock-
ing up liberals and alienating religious
leaders. But few question his rule. Saudis
seem to be adapting to the likelihood that
one unaccountable man will rule them for
decades to come. 7Saudi ArabiaLoosening up and
cracking down
The calculations of Crown Prince
Muhammad bin SalmanThe war in YemenHow to make things worse
Y
EMENI forces backed by Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
have been on a roll lately. Over the past
month the coalition has pushed 80km
north (see map), repelling the Houthis, a
group of Shia rebels that chased the
government out of Sana’a, the capital, in- It is now 12km from Hodeida, the
main port, which is held by the Houthis.
Were it to take Hodeida, the coalition
could further squeeze Houthi-controlled
areas, where most Yemenis live. The port
is Yemen’s primary conduit for humani-
tarian aid, which 22m people, or 80% of
the population, depend on. War would
disrupt the flow, leaving 8m people at risk
of starvation, says the UN.
The UNand some Western govern-
ments have urged the coalition to stop.
Six times over the past two years, hu-
manitarian appeals and American pres-
sure have staved off an Emirati-led attack
on Hodeida. But control of the port
would bring the coalition closer to its
goal of regaining the entire coastal plain,
landlocking the Houthis and giving it
more leverage in peace talks.
The main fighting force is led by the
UAE, which has already taken several
Yemeni ports in the south. It commands a
force comprised of three Yemeni groups.
The largest consists of southern fighters,
often with Salafist and separatist lean-
ings. They have been joined by northern
fighters once loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh,
a former dictator whom the Houthis
killed in December when Saleh broke off
their alliance. Local Sunnis, who call
themselves the Tihama(coastal plain)
resistance, also lend support. All told,
they number over 20,000.
The Houthis, meanwhile, are showing
signs of attrition. Many were demoral-
ised by the death of Saleh al-Sammad,
the head of their political council, in a
Saudi air strike in April. Warlords have
swept down from the mountains to
reinforce Houthi positions. But many
Yemenis feel alienated by the zealous
highlanders. Sunnis in the coastal plains
are particularly disgruntled. Should
Hodeida fall, they could provide the
coalition with fresh recruits.
Martin Griffiths, the UNenvoy to
Yemen, hopes a deal on Hodeida will
lead to new peace talks. AsThe Economist
went to press, he was heading to the UAE
with a Houthi promise to leave the port if
the UNruns it. In return, the UNhopes
the coalition will allow the central bank
to resume paying civil servants in rebel-
held areas.
One man could stand in the way.
Muhammad bin Salman, the crown
prince of Saudi Arabia, entered the war in
2015 at the invitation of the government.
With a chance finally to hobble the
Houthis, and stick it to their Iranian back-
ers, he may not want peace.Yemen’s main port could become the next battlegroundRecent gainSAUDI ARABIAYEMENDJIBOUTIERITREASana’aAdenTaizMaribHodeidaMokhaSaadaGulf of AdenRed
SeaSparsely
populatedAreas of control,June 4th 2018
Houthi Coalition led by Saudi Arabia/UAE
Source: Risk Intelligence150 km