The EconomistJune 9th 2018 Europe 45W
HEN it came, it was everything and nothing at the same
time. For over half a year Emmanuel Macron, France’s presi-
dent, waited for a German response to the grand ideas for Eu-
rope’s future he had laid out at the Sorbonne last September. Gov-
ernments rose and fell while Mr Macron drummed his fingers;
the transatlantic bond stretched, and came close to snapping.
When Angela Merkel finally gave her answer, on June 3rd, it came
not in a big speech or a government statement, but in an inter-
view with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung(FAS), a
conservative broadsheet. How very like the German chancellor.
The responses to Mrs Merkel’s interview were like descrip-
tions of the same object viewed through opposite ends of a tele-
scope. For those sympathetic to French ambitions, the chancel-
lor’s offers were weak, offering only baby steps towards the
strengthened euro zone Mr Macron urges, constrained by the
same old German red lines about rules and risk. Others were ex-
cited by what appeared to be the start of a genuine conversation,
after months of waffle and delay. Some noted that Mrs Merkel
went into considerably more detail than Mr Macron on matters
like reform of the euro zone’s bail-out fund. So was this the start
of something beautiful, or a great big German nothingburger?
It was both, and neither. Consider the ideas Mrs Merkel of-
fered the FAS. She supported Mr Macron’s proposed European
military intervention force, widely mistrusted in Germany—but
wants it folded into the ponderousEUstructures Mr Macron is
keen to circumvent. The chancellor backed a euro-zone invest-
ment fund, but on the condition that it remain tiny. She called for
a centralised European asylum system in which the authority to
grant refugee status would shift from national to EUofficials, a
proposal so radical that it has no chance of becoming law. Some
see ambition in all this. Others, the exact opposite.
Mrs Merkel often seems to channel the view of her compatri-
ots that Europe faces no systemic crisis. Germany feels rich and
secure; if other countries are in difficulties, the remedies lie at
home. Mr Macron speaks a different language, of urgency and
“European civil war”. The euro zone needs action. Europe must
have an intervention force limited to members able and willing
to deploy assets, including Britain, not one burdened by min-
nows in the name of “inclusivity”. And Donald Trump’sassaulton the global order requires a European response. Tellingly, it was
French diplomatic muscle that was deployed in the (vain) at-
tempt to squeeze concessions from the Iranian government that
would convince Mr Trump not to abandon the nuclear deal.
Mrs Merkel may have more to say in the weeks ahead, per-
haps at a Franco-German meeting on June 19th, just before an EU
summit that has long been trailed as a milestone for decisions on
the euro zone. Germany hates isolation, and right now, as Jan Te-
chau at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin puts it, the country
“is on everyone’s shit list”. Faced with the threat of tariffs on its car
exports, Germany wants to negotiate a way out of the trade spat
with America, but France and others resist bowing to Mr Trump.
Separately, Germany’s security establishment fears the govern-
ment’s miserly defence spending will place it in Mr Trump’s
crosshairs at a NATOsummit next month.
But it is hard to guess at Germany’s intentions. Where Mr Mac-
ron telegraphs his plans early, loudly and clearly, Mrs Merkel is re-
active and inscrutable. She has not made a single consequential
speech as chancellor. Her memorable moments are instead im-
provised: the selfie with a Syrian refugee in 2015 that came to
stand for her open-door immigration policy; the declaration to
journalists as she left a car in 2013, amid the revelations that
American spooks had tapped her phone, that there can be “no
spying among friends”. To add to the confusion, she has a habit of
creating expectations that she leaves unfulfilled. She notes that
Germany erred in letting refugees fester in the Middle East before
they swept into Europe, or that Mr Trump’s unilateralism obliges
Europe to master its own fate. But rarely are such words translated
into deeds. The questions are simply left hanging in the air.Après Macron, le déluge
What might shift the chancellor? Two possibilities from abroad
suggest themselves: one French, one Italian. On economics and
security the chancellor faces domestic constraints. Her centre-
right Christian Democratic Union is on hair-trigger alert to block
any moves towards a euro-zone “transfer union”; its coalition
partners, the ailing Social Democrats, have alighted on scepti-
cism towards military spending as a vote-winning strategy.
The new ingredient is France. Mr Macron says all the right
things to please Germany, but also puts forward an argument it
fears is right: that an unreformed Europe is exposed to destructive
populism. That may be why Berlin and Paris are abuzzwith ru-
mours of a looming grand bargain: German concessions on the
euro, and perhaps slightly less grudging support for Mr Macron’s
military plans, in exchange for French agreement that the EUcan
negotiate with America before the tariffs are lifted. (Such ru-
mours, admittedly, do not come overburdened with evidence.)
Mr Trump’s tough line on trade and defence may be splitting
France and Germany, but that creates opportunities for deals.
The darker scenario is a crisis sparked in Italy. The conven-
tional wisdom is that the outlandish fiscal plans of the populist
government that took office last week will further harden Ger-
man hearts against proposals to spread risk in the euro area. This
is certainly true for now. But if an Italian showdown with Brus-
sels appears to threaten the integrity of the euro zone as a whole,
Mrs Merkel will shed her caution and act to contain the damage,
for instance by deliberately turning a blind eye if the European
Central Bank turns on the money tap. This is plainly no way to
run a fragile currency union. But Mrs Merkel has only ever acted
when staring into the abyss. 7Angela plays it cool
There is still no sense of urgency in Germany. That is a problem for Emmanuel MacronCharlemagne