184 Jonathan Cohen
For Buber and Rosenzweig, the wholeness, separateness, integrity, and
authenticity of both the divine and human “persons” are part and parcel
of the dialogical experience. In the theology of Buber and Rosenzweig,
“monotheism,” or the oneness and unity of God, does not function as a
descriptive-ontological category, in contradistinction to polytheism or to
intradeical multiplicity, but rather as a prescriptive-existential category: it
derives from the norm that only two authentic, unifi ed, and self-consistent
beings can genuinely encounter and face each other.14
Th is God is the “father” and giver of all dialogical experience. Were it
not for this God, then, in the words of Nachum Glatzer, we would live in
a “neutral, blind, cold unconcerned universe.”15 Since God has “turned”
to the world and to human beings, addressing them in an act of love and
concern, the world has been “transformed into a place where man is ad-
dressed by the Th ou and where he . . . may or may not give answer.” God
can be glimpsed behind all dialogical encounters between human beings
— encounters based on the acceptance of others in their totality, on full
mutuality of relationship, and on a resolve to refrain from even the most
subtle forms of exploitation (i.e., not relating to others as mere objects of
“interest” or sources of “enjoyment”). Such dialogical encounters may also
take place between persons and objects or places in “nature,” between per-
sons and events, or between persons and texts. In all such encounters, the
place, the situation, or the text “speak”; they address and challenge one to
respond with one’s “whole being.” In truth, for Buber and Rosenzweig, a
genuine response within the framework of an “I-Th ou” experience such as
this can only be made with one’s whole self — never with one’s thoughts,
feelings, or actions alone.
Although it is sometimes diffi cult to conceive how “I-Th ou” encounters
could take place between a whole people and its God (since this would
seem to mean that the people are responding “as one,” thereby negating the
inalienable uniqueness, authenticity, and integrity of the individuals com-
posing that people), Buber and Rosenzweig assume that such “collective
dialogues” can and do take place. At certain junctures in a people’s history,
it is “addressed” by events — and must respond as a people.
Although the God experienced by Buber and Rosenzweig is one and
separate from the world and human beings, He is not abstract and removed
from human experience. Neither, however, is He so available that he can be
conjured up and manipulated for human purposes. He appears where and
when He wishes, to whom He wishes, in accordance with His purposes,
which are not always disclosed or readily intelligible. Th is living God is not