Concepts of Scripture in the Schools of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael 51But Scripture’s active participation in interpretation extends beyond the
initial engagement of the verse (i.e., of itself ). Indeed, the Rabbi Ishmael
midrashim attribute to Scripture a wide range of actions: “Scripture [ha-
katuv] comes to teach,” “Scripture draws an analogy,” “Scripture prohib-
its,” “Scripture singles out this case from a broader statement,” and so on.8
Strikingly, in some cases, Scripture teaches the reader how best to interpret,
and it does this in two ways. In some passages, Scripture is represented as
providing general hermeneutic rules.
“When a man gives to another an ass, an ox, a sheep or all animals to
guard . . .” [Exod. 22:9]: I thus know only about an ass, an ox, and a sheep.
How about any other beast? [Scripture] teaches, saying: “Or all animals to
guard.” I read, then, “All animals to guard.” What does it teach by saying,
“an ass, an ox, a sheep”? Because if it had read only “all animals” I might
have understood that the keeper is liable only if all beasts have been put
in his care. Th erefore it says, “an ass, an ox, a sheep,” to declare him liable
for each one by itself. And what does [Scripture] teach by saying, “all ani-
mals”? Scripture [ha-katuv] comes to teach you that a general statement
that is added to a specifi c statement includes everything. (Mekhilta Nezi-
qin 16, pp. 302 – 3; Lauterbach 3:121)Exodus 22:9 contains an apparent redundancy. It lists the domestic animals
that a person might lend his fellow — an ass, an ox, a sheep — and then states
“or all animals.” But initial impressions notwithstanding, the Mekhilta sug-
gests that both phrases are necessary since the absence of either could lead
to confusion: the general statement is necessary lest one think Exodus is
referring only to the three animals listed, and the enumeration is necessary
lest one think Exodus is referring only to cases when a person guards “all
animals.” Th is is all well and good, and one would think the issue has been
resolved, but the derashah (midrashic interpretation) does not end here.
Instead, it suggests that the entire passage has been doing double work —
resolving the specifi c matter of the animals in Exodus 22:9 but also com-
municating a general interpretive conclusion: “Scripture [ha-katuv] comes
to teach you that a general statement that is added to a specifi c statement
includes everything.” In resolving legal matters, Scripture employs inter-
pretive practices, and these practices — and the principles that underlie
them — become the ultimate content of its teaching.
Th e second way Scripture imparts the craft of proper interpretation is
by setting interpretive precedent, that is, by functioning as an interpretive