48 The Economist May 21st 2022
Europe
ThewarinUkraine
Unblocking Odessa
T
he fiascoof the Gallipoli campaign of
1915 was caused, in part, by a global food
crisis. The Ottoman empire’s entry into the
first world war, on Germany’s side, blocked
grain exports from the Russian empire,
which then encompassed Ukraine. By forc
ing open the passage between the Black Sea
and the Mediterranean, Britain and its al
lies hoped to knock the Turks out of the
war and restore Russian trade. That would
help lower soaring food prices, and
strengthen Russia’s weak finances. But the
landings in the Dardanelles turned to di
saster and the allies withdrew after a year.
A century on, the West faces a similar
conundrum: how to get Ukraine’s vast food
crop past Russia’s blockade to relieve glo
bal food shortages. Andrey Stavnitser, the
owner of Ukraine’s largest private ship
pingterminal operator, tis, says that Uk
rainian grain silos are largely full, and
there is not enough room for this year’s
crop. “If we can’t store it, it will start rot
ting,” he says. Frustratingly, Russia is able
to export its grain, including crops stolen
from occupied land, from the Black Sea
while Ukraine’s is shut in. “Unblocking
Odessa is as important as providing weap
ons to Ukraine,” he says.
The eu is seeking to expand alternative
routes by rail and road. But these can take
only a fraction of Ukraine’s exports. If the
bulk of Ukraine’s grain is to get out, it must
be by sea. But how? Some people are now
exploring the idea of naval convoys to es
cort merchant vessels in and out of Odessa
and nearby ports. Mr Stavnitser hopes for a
un convoy led by Turkey. James Stavridis,
nato’s former supreme allied commander,
has suggested taking a leaf out of the oper
ation by America and some allies to protect
oil tankers in the Persian Gulf during the
IranIraq war of the 1980s.
But James Foggo, the excommander of
nato forces in the Mediterranean, argues
the parallel is misleading. “The difference
is: Iran was not a nuclear power. Russia is a
nuclear power. Russia is a major power and
there is a risk of escalation.” The tanker war
was fraught; America’s warships were
struck by Iraq and Iran and one of them
mistakenly shot down an Iranian airliner.
Convoys in the Black Sea face military,
legal and political constraints. Begin with
Russia’s “antinavy”—the thicket of anti
aircraft, antishipping and electronicwar
fare systems based in Crimea, which Rus
sia annexed in 2014. This allows it to dom
inate much of the Black Sea from the land.
And despite the sinking of the Moskva,
Russia’s flagship in the Black Sea, its naval
forces remain powerful—including ships
and submarines armed with Kalibr cruise
missiles. Even if Russia shrinks from
attacking convoys, says Michael Petersen
of the us Naval War College, ships in port
will be sitting ducks. Odessa is within
range of Russia’s Bastionb antiship
cruise missiles in Crimea, he notes.
Ukraine has heavily mined its waters to
prevent a Russian amphibious assault.
Odessa’s beaches are closed and guarded
by soldiers in camouflaged outposts. The
port, including its famous Potemkin Stairs,
ODESSA
How to get Ukrainian grain to a hungry world?
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