146 Chapter 6
morewidelyavailable.He askedhis plant’s employeesfor suggestionson whatto name
the newbeverage.In his suggestion,he toldthe worksto let theirfantasie—Germanfor
“fantasy”—be uninhibited.In response,salesmanJoe Knippimmediatelyshoutedout
Fanta. AlthoughKeithwasa privatebusinessman,he oftenfoundthat the Nazistategave
himproductionordersand threatenedhimwithpunishmentif he did not comply.When
the warended,KeithreestablishedcontactwithCoke’s Atlantaofficeandhelpedthe
companyresumeCokeproductionin postwarGermany.
Uponthe war’s end,Coca-Colacommissionedan investigatorto lookintoKeith’s
activitiesin the unsupervisedperiod.TheinvestigationfoundthatneitherKeithnor his
lawyer,WalterOppenhoff,everjoinedthe NaziParty,despitethe reprisalsthatwere
promisedagainstthemon accountof this refusal.TheThirdReichalsodemandedthat
KeithappointNazileadersto the GermanCoca-Coladivision’s boardof directors,but
Keithdid not obey.Dueto Keith’s efforts,manyAmericanCokeemployeeswereableto
remainaliveduringthe war.Keithturnedoverboththe wartimerevenuefromCoca-Cola
sales,andownershipof Fantaitself,to the Americanparentcompany.^112 The manprac-
ticeda remarkablecodeof honorthroughoutthesehardtimes.In lieu of the respectthat
Keithdeserves,we findhis creationbeingignorantlyimpugnedby the likesof Michael
Mooreandthe producersofThe Corporation. MichaelParentiignoresthe realityof this
casestudywhenhe asserts,“Throughoutthe war,US corporatechiefswereableto main-
taindirectownershipandcontrolovertheirGermansubsidiarieswithminimalinterfer-
encefromthe Nazis,whowereprimarilyinterestedin keepingwar productiongoing.”^113
AnotherU.S.-basedcompanythatThe Corporationaccusesof aidingNaziismis Interna-
tionalBusinessMachine—betterknownas IBM.In the propagandadocumentary,Edwin
Blackexplains,“WhenHitlercameto powerin 1933,his goalwasto dismantleand
destroythe Jewishcommunity.Thiswasan enterpriseso vastthatit requiredthe re-
sourcesof a computer.But in 1933therewasno computer.Whattherewas,wasthe IBM
punchcardsystem,whichcontrolledandstoredinformationbaseduponthe holesthat
werepunchedin variousrowsandcolumns.Naturallytherewasno off-the-shelfsoft-
warethatthereis today.Eachapplicationwascustom-designedand“an engineerhad
to... configureit” directly,in a hands-onmanner.“Millionsof peopleof all religionsand
nationalitiesandcharacteristicswentthroughthe concentrationcampsystem.That’s an
extraordinarytrafficmanagementprogramthat requiredan IBMsystemin everyrailroad
directionandan IBMsystemin everyconcentrationcamp.”^114 Blackaddsthat,rather
thansimplybe soldto the ThirdReich,suchtabulatingmachineswereleased,andthey
requiredon-siteservicingoncea monthby an IBMemployee.As IBM’s Germandivision
had to supplyregularmaintenancefor thesemachines,Blackwouldhaveus believe,this
provesthat IBM’s Americanhomeofficewasperforceawareof, and condoned,whatwas
happeningin the concentrationcamps.As we shalllearnsoon,it is misleadingto assume
thatthe Germandivisionreliablycommunicatedwithor relayedinformationto the U.S.
homeoffice.Still,Blackclaimsto havein his possessiona letterfromOctober9, 1941,
addresseddirectlyto IBM’s CEOat the time,ThomasJ. Watson,Sr. (1874–1956),detailing
the activitiesof IBM’s Germansubsidiary.Blackcompiledtheseclaimsin his bookIBM
and the Holocaust. MichaelParentirepeatsthem—InternationalBusinessMachine“pros-
peredin Germanyandthe occupiedterritoriesby supplyingthe technologyneededto
identify,enslave,and exterminatemillionsof EuropeanJewsand othervictims.”^115
ReviewingBlack’s bookin theNewYorkTimes, RichardBernsteinobservesthatit
sabotagesitselfin thatit ignores“the moraldistinctionbetweenthe sellersof ropeand
thosewhouse ropeto hangpeople.... Mr. Black’s caseis longand heavilydocumented,
and yet he doesnot demonstratethatI.B.M.bearssomeuniqueor decisiveresponsibility
for the evilthatwasdone.”^116 CommentarymagazinesenioreditorGabrielSchoenfeld
similarlydeliberates—alsoin theNewYorkTimes—thatthe mainquestionis not whether