302 Chapter 12
hegemonyandbecomingthe newmonopolisticcentralgovernment(moreaboutthat
later).
Regardingmy questionof howI couldaddressProtectionServiceXthreateningme for
tryingto unsubscribefromit, the closestRothbardianshavecometo givinga coherent
replyis this.ShouldProtectionServiceXthreatenme, thenI can still pleafor Protection
ServiceY’s help.MaybeProtectionServiceYwill threatento use retaliatoryforceagainst
ServiceXif this continues.ProtectionServiceYcan go as far as forminga coalitionwith
otherprotectionservices.Thiscoalitionwill exerciseretributiveforceagainstany protec-
tionservicethatrefusesits customersthe rightto unsubscribe.BehindServiceX’s back,I
can hireotherprotectionagenciesto gangup on the evil agencyand threatento destroy
the evil agencyif it doesnot let its customersunsubscribe.
But thatretortis fallacious.It assumesthateveryagencywillbe roughlyequalin
powerandsize.Theanarchistsoverlookthat,undercompetition,somecompetitorsbe-
comebiggerandricherthanthe others.Botha lonepettypurse-snatcherandthe Mafia
countas privateagencies,but the Mafiahas moremoneyand manpowerthanthe purse-
snatcherdoes.Whattypicallygoesunmentionedby anarchistsis that,historically,the
mostpowerfulempireon a continentcouldgainthe powerto set rulesfor othergovern-
mentson that continent... and sometimeswholeothercontinentsas well.It neednot set
the rulesby directconquest.Onceothernationsbecomeawareof the empire’s military
might,the empirecan simplyexercise“soft rule”—it can intimidateothercountriesinto
exactingthe policiesthatit wants,muchin the waythata well-establishedMafioso
reachesa pointwherehe can get whathe wantswithoutliftinga finger.Whenthe
OttomanEmpirewasat its peak,it wasableto set standardsfor the rest of the Middle
East.Duringthe nineteenthcenturythe BritishEmpirewasableto set the rulesfor India,
Ireland,HongKong,Australia,NewZealand,and manypartsof Africa,suchas Zimbab-
we (whichwasthenRhodesia,as it wasconqueredby EnglishmanCecilRhodes).The
sameprinciplewouldapplyin anarchy.The richest,mostpowerfuldefenseagencycould
declarewaron the smalleronesandphysicallybeatthemintosubmission.Andshould
the dominatingdefenseagencybe a highlyilliberalone,thatwoulddestroyfreedomfor
everyone.Thatis the greatironyof self-describedlibertarians—weretheyeverto institute
the societalstructureof theirdreams,theirpreciousanarchywouldsimplybe a transi-
tionalphasethatwouldlikelyrevertto a newimperialorder.Thisis exactlythe sortof
monopolistichegemonythatanarcho-pluralismis intendedto stop.As noticedby Harry
Binswanger,life underanarchywouldbe comparableto a baseballgamewherethe team
thathadthe mostpointsaftereverytwoinningscouldalterthe rulesfor bothteamsfor
the nexttwo innings.It couldapplyone set of rulesfor itselfand anotherset of rulesfor
the otherteam.Shouldeveryprivatedefenseagencylookout for its ownfinancialsurvi-
val—and this is exactlywhatthe anarchistscounton—thenwhyshouldthe winingteam
not rig the rest of the gameto perpetuateits lead?^8
Thisis anothergapingcontradictionin the anarchists’ rejoinder:the anarchymodelis
supposedto precludeany protectionservicefromdictatingthe rulesor businessmodelof
another.Recallthe anarchist’s objectionto the ideathata singlepartycan forciblydictate
the extentto whichotherpartiescan dealin the issuanceof physicalforce.But thatis
exactlywhatwillhappenif ProtectionServiceYor its coalitioncan unleashforceto
pressureServiceXto amendits policies.Considerthe implications.Underthis circum-
stance,eitherServiceYalone,or ServiceYand its coalition,are behavingas a monopolis-
tic hegemonyor imperialcartel.
Someformsof violenceproduceconsequencesthat cannotbe personalized,and there-
forecannotbe privatized.Thisissuerefutesmorethanmarket“anarchy”; it refutesa
commoncontentionby libertariansthat civillaw shouldreplacecriminallaw.Someliber-
tariansobjectto the notionof criminallaw,whichstressesthatif youinitiatethe use of