Notes to Chapter 2 { 29 5Ucko interprets Moser’s remark as expressing a more modest ambition: “The expression
merely sounds overbold (tollkühn). Little more was meant by it than that the work of edu-
cating the Jews (der Juden) had to be organized by Jews (von jüdischer Seite); but with re-
gard to the... conceptualization of the secularized work on the Jews (Arbeit am Judentum)
that the perceived substantiality [of the Jews] demanded, this expression is very significant”
(“Geistesgeschichtliche Grundlagen,” 327 ).
72. Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden, Entwurf von Statuten des Vereins für
Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden, 3.
73. Ibid., 4.
74. Joseph McCarney, Hegel on History, 157. Merold Westphal likewise notes the distinc-
tion in Hegel’s use of “state” between a “‘strictly political state’”—that is, “the state as a
people’s system of government”—and the state “as the whole of their life together, including
in the broadest sense, their culture” (“Hegel’s Radical Idealism,” 89 ).
75. Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden, Entwurf von Statuten, 5.
76. Toews, Hegelianism, 112.
77. On Henning’s and Förster’s different paths toward accommodation of the Restora-
tion Prussian state, see ibid., 118 – 22.
78. “For Förster, Henning, and Schulze, the political task of creating a vital community of
reborn Germans had been transformed into a pedagogical task of teaching their contempo-
raries to recognize the reality of that community in the existing state” (ibid., 120 ).
79. Ibid., 114.
80. Carové assessed the state in yet another way. He viewed not only the Prussian state
but the state in general as incapable of achieving the ultimate manifestation of reason, and
therefore as a form destined to be transcended in the universal ethical community of a frater-
nal “church,” a “Kingdom of God on this Earth” (ibid., 139 ). On Carové’s vision, see ibid.,
134 – 140.
81. Quoted in ibid., 116.
82. Ibid., 117.
83. Ibid., 111.
84. Although Prussia was Hegel’s model of “the modern state of actualized Reason,”
Toews writes, “the Prussia comprehended in Hegel’s political philosophy, however, was not
the Prussia of the reactionary repressions of 1819 – 20 but a ‘progressive’ state—the Prussia of
Stein, Hardenberg, and Humboldt, the Prussia of the Reform Era.... [However,] the Prussia
of the 1820 s was no longer the Prussia of 1807 – 19 ,... the Prussia Hegel comprehended could
not be simply identified with the Prussia in which Hegel lived, for the latter was inwardly
divided between progressive principle and a somewhat less than progressive practice” (ibid.,
96 – 97 ).
85. Hegel remarks in the preface to the 1817 Encyclopedia: “The title should suggest
partly the scope of the whole, and partly the intent to leave the details for oral delivery”
(Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, 46 ; the German original is in Enzyk-
lopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisses, 5 ). Duncan Forbes’s remarks on
Hegel’s orality and what I am calling Hegel’s performativity are illuminating: “It is wrong
... to think of the dialectic as functioning as a process of logical demonstration or deduction
in a closed system.... It was the result of Hegel’s desire ‘to think life’; it is a way of thinking
concretely and seeing things whole, whose conclusions cannot be proved or disproved, but