to lay mines in a nearby area. He exploited his mastery of the local environment,
ordered his crew to proceed at a speed that minimized noise, eluded the adversary
submarine and shore radar, and accomplished the mine-laying mission on
time.^173 All three of China’s fleets, moreover, have reportedly trained with
what appear to be advanced mobile mines. In December 2005, NSF sailors were
photographed hoisting a ‘‘new type of sea mine.’’^174
The PLAN has for some time pursued nuclear submarine missions of extended
duration. In his recently published memoirs, Adm. Liu Huaqing relates how
he raised the priority of long-duration exercises for PLAN nuclear submarines,
testing all parameters of these new capabilities.^175 Apparently as part of these
expanded activities, the current PLAN chief of staff, Sun Jianguo, reportedly
commandedHan403 during a mid-1980s’ mission of ninety days,^176 breaking
the eighty-four-day undersea endurance record previously set by USS
Nautilus.^177 Chinese military medical journals demonstrate a very clear interest
in undersea medicine, in particular the physical and psychological challenges
surrounding lengthy submerged missions.^178
Based on photos and anecdotal evidence, Chinese submarines go to sea fre-
quently, though not usually for extended periods. But the submarine force seems
set to range ever farther afield. According to ONI’s Scott Bray,
China claims that its submarines have conducted long-range patrols almost since the
inception of the Chinese submarine force. According to Chinese press reports, PLA(N)
submarines have occasionally ventured into the Pacific Ocean and, with some degree of
regularity, continue to conduct these ‘‘cruises of long duration.’’ Although China has
apparently been satisfied with only a handful of these deployments every year, the
growing technological capabilities of the PLA(N) submarine force and China’s evolving
maritime strategy, which calls for an operational capability beyond the littoral in support
of an anti-access mission, create the conditions for Beijing to opt for an increased
submarine presence in the Western Pacific Ocean east of the Ryukyu Island chain.^179MIW Forces
Particularly since 2002, when the PLA issued a new Outline of Military Train-
ing and Evaluation, PLAN surface forces have engaged in an array of increasingly
realistic, increasingly complex training involving longer at-sea periods and multi-
ple vessels of different classes. These forces, networked through various datalinks,
prosecute exercises such as ‘‘beyond-visual-range attacks against maritime and
shore-based targets.’’ There still appears to be significant room for improvement
in air defense and coordination with submarine and coastal defense forces.^180
Improvised exercises have also been carried out recently by sea-mine warehouse
officers. An SSF mobile sea-mine warehouse, for instance, has been tasked with
‘‘Four Transformations’’ to improve high-speed, long-distance mobile mine
transport.^181 An ESF sea-mine warehouse has conducted independent, mobile
Can China Become a Maritime Power? 97