China’s ‘‘sovereignty, maritime rights, and great cause of reunification’’ with
Taiwan. Such threats may necessitate a defensive, ‘‘just war’’ along China’s
‘‘borderlines, seacoasts, and air spaces.’’ They state that China is unusual in the
number and magnitude of its territorial disputes: one million square kilometers
of maritime territory, or ‘‘one ninth of China’s national land territory,’’ remains
under contention.^200 The authors discuss energy, a factor that increasingly influ-
ences Chinese strategists. To ‘‘ensure the security of [the] channel[s] of [our]
strategic energy supply,’’ they observe, is ‘‘of great significance to our develop-
ment in the long run.’’^201 The authors voice concerns that remaining challenges
in long-distance power projection, operations, and logistics will make these
battlefields very different from ‘‘inland war fields,’’ and thereby ‘‘disadvantageous
to us.’’^202 To address these disparities, the authors suggest integrating civilian and
military forces, combining ‘‘regular warfare with guerilla warfare on the sea,’’
employing asymmetric ‘‘trump card’’weapons, mixing ‘‘high-tech weapons
with common weapons,’’ and blending military operations with political, eco-
nomic,^203 and legal measures within the larger politico-military effort.^204
PLAN doctrine appears to have evolved with both external security threats and
China’s ability to project power. From its inception on April 23, 1949 until
1985, the PLAN was charged with coastal defense. As a subordinate organiza-
tion, the PLAN was assigned to support PLA ground forces in what Mao
envisioned as a major land war againstthe superpowers. Following the 1972
rapprochement with the United States, this concern applied solely to the USSR.
During the late 1970s, however, evidence emerged that China might be
moving beyond a policy of coastal defense. The PLAN sent submarines into
the SCS, as well as beyond the ‘‘first island chain’’ into the Pacific Ocean, for
the first time. In January 1977, specifically, submarine 252 performed a 3,300
nautical mile voyage in Pacific waters. In July of that year, submarine 296 carried
out successful diving tests in the SCS.^205 By the mid-1980s, the PLAN had
developed a broader ability to conduct ‘‘offshore operations’’ as part of its larger
naval strategy predicated on offshore defense.
An ‘‘offshore defense strategy’’ was formally approved in 1985 by Deng Xiaop-
ing and the other members of China’s Central Military Commission.^206 This
major paradigm shift was driven by Deng’s assessment that great-power
war would not occur for some time and that coastal economic development
should take precedence. Increasing concerns over maritime resources and sover-
eignty—particularly with regard to Taiwan as the island began to democratize
in the late 1980s, raising popular questions about its status vis-a`-vis the main-
land—accelerated the process. Liu Huaqing further articulated and implemented
the new strategic paradigm. In 1983, Adm. Liu recalls,
I stressed that we should achieve a unified understanding of the concept of ‘‘offshore’’
according to Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping’s instructions. Our ‘‘offshore’’ areas are the
Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, the seas around the Spratly Islands andCan China Become a Maritime Power? 101