as submarines are used to deploy sea mine barriers in the water channels outside
of enemy ports to blockade them.’’^225
Active-defense concepts allow for offensive actions even in a Chinese
SLOC-protection campaign. For instance, ‘‘active and initiative local offensive
operations are an effective measure to reduce and limit enemy capabilities
for transportation sabotage combat in atransportation defense campaign.’’^226
Specifically, ‘‘in order to weaken and limit enemy capabilities for SLOC attack,
we sometimes need to attack and blockade enemy bases and airports.’’^227
The authors argue that China’s level of offensive measures in a SLOC defense
campaign should vary both with relative capabilities and with the operational sit-
uation: ‘‘[W]hen one has a stronger operational force, launch an active offensive
to attack the enemy’s SLOC attack force....[W]hen one does not have the
ability to conduct an active attack and the enemy does not attack us, we start to
launch transport activities under concealment....[W]hen the enemy has started
blockade and attack activities, we start the campaign with various anti-blockade
and counterattack combat activities.’’^228
Despite emphasizing offensive fleet action throughout the chapter, however,
the authors acknowledge that the dispersed nature of combat and fleet operations
today makes obtaining a single decisive battle difficult.^229 The authors’ Mahanian
approach, which equates to ‘‘the best defense is a good offense,’’ appears difficult
to reconcile with a strategy for the protection of friendly shipping—a difficult,
asset-intensive, defensive mission. Not surprisingly, the authors appear to have
struggled with this dilemma as much as Mahan did, as all of Mahan’s disciples
have, and as the U.S. Navy does today. The authors acknowledge that protecting
shipping is a defensive mission and thatscarce assets will likely limit a navy’s
ability to protect all shipping.^230 But when it comes to presenting a solution for
this dilemma, they fall back on the primacy of offense. This is highlighted by
the authors’ caveat that ‘‘Generally speaking, the SLOC protection campaign is
a defensive campaign. Nevertheless, active and initiative local offensive operations
are an effective measure to reduce and limit enemy capabilities....’’^231 The rest of
the paragraph advocates seizing opportunities to attack first whenever they
present themselves, even when performing a ‘‘defensive’’ mission. This dovetails
with Mahan’s theory that the best way to protect one’s own shipping is to seek
out and destroy the enemy’s fleet, sweeping his flag from vital waters.
‘‘Naval Campaigns’’ urges both sophisticated knowledge of the strategic and
campaign/operational levels of warfare and an integrated air/surface/subsurface
approach to planning. Despite this exhortation, however, a warning about
friendly fire considerations^232 suggests that PLAN strategists harbor some doubts
about the navy’s ability to coordinate complex operations. Friendly-fire decon-
fliction severely challenges even the best navies (especially in ASW), so the
authors’ comment that blockading forces ‘‘must not trespass’’ on other friendly
forces’ areas is rather telling. Numerous references to both ‘‘hard’’ and ‘‘soft’’
Can China Become a Maritime Power? 105