Asia Looks Seaward

means of defeating a naval adversary indicate that they appreciate the value of

electronic warfare and of tactical and operational deception. The authors

routinely stress the need for good intelligence and reconnaissance in support of

naval operations. The level of ISR the authors require seems to exceed current

PLAN capabilities even seven years later, however, and thus may represent

advocacy on behalf of increased capabilities.

The authors repeatedly discuss the need for air superiority, and in each section

they provide recommended guidance for the employment of fighter aircraft.

This would be relevant for a Taiwan scenario, but, since the PLAN currently

lacks carrier-based aircraft, not for missions beyond the range of land-based air.

The authors are either discussing Taiwan or implicitly lobbying for a PLAN

aircraft-carrier capability or both. The section on ‘‘Organization and Covering

Transport Ships to Load and Unload and Leave Port’’ seems to contemplate a

naval expeditionary task force assembling to steam to one common objective,

as opposed to an ordinary convoy of merchant/cargo ships cruising along the

Chinese coast.^233 While these statements needto be compared with those in

other PLAN doctrinal writings as they become available outside China, it seems

reasonable to conclude that Beijing will not accept a maritime energy blockade

and is already developing serious countermeasures.

Inferences About China’s Modernization Plan

China’s evolving platforms and weaponry point to an access-denial strategy

that is wholly consistent with Beijing’s focus on the Taiwan issue. There is no

doubt that the PLA is fully committed to dominance of the littoral battlespace

around China, with an intense focus on the waters and airspace around Taiwan.

Everything the PLA is developing, with the exceptions of its ICBM force, its

SSBNs, and perhaps its SSNs and LPD, seems to be devoted to this cause. Some

of the PLA’s more modern ships and aircraft will allow it to extend its combat

power slightly farther, into the SCS, and to a limited extent into parts of the

western Pacific. The PLAN is also capable of sending limited numbers of

warships on occasional transoceanic cruises. These deployments, however,

are severely limited by the navy’s limited number of replenishment vessels.

While China’s shipyards are fully capable of building vessels that could perform

at-sea replenishment operations, they evidently are not doing so. This suggests

that, at least for the time being, China is limiting its military focus to matters

closer to home.

Specifically, China’s power-projection capabilities are focused on a Taiwan

contingency. There is little evidence to show that the PLAN is developing the

capabilities necessary to extend its ability to project power (as the United States

would conceive of it) much beyond China’s claimed territorial waters. Granted,

PLAN ships carry sophisticated long-range ASCMs, and some of their aircraft

106 Asia Looks Seaward