can carry LACMs. The newest SSNs might be similarly equipped as well. But the
PLAN does not have the capability to deploy to distant areas and establish an
oceanic sanctuary from which it can conduct military strikes against opposing
navies or targets ashore.
However, such an interpretation does not capture the full range and potential
ambition of China’s naval development. ‘‘China’s maritime strategy is evolving
along two paths,’’ explains ONI’s Scott Bray. ‘‘First, China is focused on a
regional anti-access capability, which is principally applicable in preventing
third-party intervention in a Taiwan scenario. Second, China is simultaneously
expanding its maritime strategy to include a mission to protect China’s growing
dependence on maritime commerce for economic development.’’^234 China’s
growing surface forces could well support missions beyond Taiwan. Indeed,
many of China’s amphibious craft are based at Zhanjiang in the SSF—rather
distant from the Taiwan Strait. Increasing air-defense capabilities hint at genuine
blue-water ambitions, since land-based aircraft have sufficient range to cover
most missions associated with Taiwan contingencies. After all, PLAN ships
would benefit from land-based air cover when operating near the Chinese coast.
In a similar vein, rumors of Chinese aircraft-carrier development have intensified
and even reached quasi-official status.^235
Here it is useful to reflect on the challenges the United States faced as it sought
to accurately understand Japanese naval development prior to World War II.
In a sobering essay, Thomas G. Mahnken, now the U.S. deputy assistant secre-
tary of defense for policy planning, demonstrates that, despite the U.S. Navy’s
making war with Japan its primary planning contingency, allocating considerable
resources to analyze this contingency, and exploiting the large amount of relevant
information in open sources (95 percent, in the view of the U.S. naval attache ́in
Tokyo),^236 mirror imaging, ethnocentric assumptions, and lack of imagination
caused U.S. analysts to missrevolutionary Japanese tactical and technological
innovations. Because of such shortfalls, the U.S. Army and Navy ‘‘repeatedly
discounted credible reports that Japan had achieved a capability that the United
States lacked, whether it was the Type 91 long-range armor-piercing naval shell,
the Type 93 oxygen-propelled torpedo [which boasted not only a minimal wake
butalsoarangeoverfourtimesthatestimated by the U.S.], or the Type 0
fighter.’’^237 As one former head of ONI’s Far East Section, Arthur H. McCollum,
recalls, ‘‘The tendency was to judge technical developments on the basis of
our own technology and on the assumption that our technology was superior
to any other. So if something was reported that the Japanese did have and
we didn’t then, obviously, it was wrong.’’^238 Of course, one hopes the United
States never enters into a conflict with China along the lines of the Pacific War
with Japan. These lessons are nonetheless vital to understanding China’s rapid
if complicated maritime development and its rise as a great power in East Asia
and the world.
Can China Become a Maritime Power? 107