littorals—thus greatly increasing theimportance of mine countermeasures for
coastal states that might find themselves the targets of U.S. naval action.
A war between China and the United States over Taiwan should be avoidable—
provided the United States honors its commitment to the ‘‘One China’’ principle
by consistently opposing Taiwan independence and Beijing addresses the
concerns of Taiwanese voters understandably determined to safeguard their
democratic way of life. Unfortunately, current Taiwanese president Chen Shui-
bian, who has a history of provoking Beijing, has recently made a series of
extremely dangerous pro-independence statements. On March 4, 2007, Chen
publicly declared that Taiwan has ‘‘Four Wants and One Without’’: (1) ‘‘Taiwan
wants independence,’’ (2) ‘‘Taiwan wants rectification of the country’s name’’
(i.e., changing it from ‘‘Republic of China’’ to ‘‘Taiwan,’’ including in the case
of local firms whose names currently contain the word ‘‘China’’), (3) ‘‘Taiwan
wants a new constitution,’’ and (4) ‘‘Taiwan wants development.’’ The ‘‘One
Without’’ is ‘‘Taiwan does not have a left-right political problem’’; it has a
national identity problem, and the question is independence or unification with
China.^243 These statements, which threaten to cross redlines that Beijing has
clearly drawn, directly contravene Chen’s 2000 election pledge of the ‘‘four no’s
and the one won’t,’’ in which he committed ‘‘not to declare independence, change
Taiwan’s name or hold a referendum on the independence issue.’’^244
In a sign that Chen is far from enjoying a monopoly on Taiwanese public
opinion, the Nationalist Party, or KMT, disavowed the president’s machinations
as a ‘‘disaster for Taiwan.’’ The People’s First Party, a KMTally, ‘‘filed a civil law-
suit...charging Chen with sedition’’ because ‘‘his remarks could lead to war,
impacting Taiwan and other parts of the world,’’ according to party spokesman
Lee Hung-chun.^245 The bottom line is that Washington cannot let Taipei declare
independence, which would be a disaster for all involved. Lest U.S. concerns
about free riding continue to increase, Taipei will also need to do more to ‘‘tend
to its own defenses.’’^246 In a larger strategic sense, the United States and China
will need to develop a positive but realistic understanding of their respective roles
in the Asia-Pacific that might best be termed ‘‘competitive coexistence.’’
Perhaps even more difficult to reconcile in the long run will be Japan’s regional
maritime role and its relations with China. While Japan’s defense and foreign
policy have changed dramatically since it opened up to the world in 1853, SLOC
security has endured as a primary national security concern. Official Diet testi-
mony holds that ‘‘the greatest cause of [Japan’s World War II] defeat was the loss
of shipping’’to Allied interdiction efforts.^247 These persistent concerns have been
raised anew by China’s reemergence as a sea power. A key indication is former
Prime Minister Hashimoto’s worry that ‘‘many commercial flights and aircraft
[were] forced to divert around those areas affected’’ by China’s March 1996 mis-
sile tests, during which ‘‘some of the missiles landed in waters only 60 km from
[Japan’s] Yonaguni island....’’^248
Can China Become a Maritime Power? 109