As a result, Japan is gradually strengthening its maritime-defense and power-
projection capabilities. In October 2004, the JMSDF and Coast Guard led
Northeast Asia’s first Proliferation Security Initiative exercise. In the Indian Ocean
in 2006, the JMSDF fuelled allied vessels to support operations in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, Japan is struggling to assert control over its exclusive economic zone,
some of which is in dispute. Japanese policymakers, motivatedbyincreasingly
‘‘realist’’threat perceptions, are exploring new directions in their pursuit of SLOC
security. The extent to which these emerging impulses can transcend funding
constraints imposed by demographic and economic challenges, as well as consti-
tutional questions over the use of force on the part of the Japanese armed forces,
remains a pivotal question for both Chinese planners and for East Asian maritime
security.Overall Assessment
The authors of the PLA’s first English-language volume on strategy describe the
current age as an ‘‘era of sea’’ in which maritime states, like their predecessors, will
employ Mahanian and other strategies to‘‘actively develop comprehensive sea
power’’ and ‘‘expand strategic depth at sea.’’^249 China seems to be adapting to
the seas by applying various strands of Western thought to its own unique under-
standing of and experiences with sea power, as well as its larger history and stra-
tegic traditions. For example, Mahan’s emphasis on trade following the flag is
accepted in China long after falling out of favor in the West, but aggressive power
projection is rejected as being alien to Chinese strategic culture. Long-range influ-
ence is described as peaceful and nonmilitary in nature, while ‘‘for military circles
in China, command of the sea means one side in a conflict having control over a
specific sea area for a specific period of time.’’^250
As Chinese strategists look seaward,they seem in particular to invoke the
thinking of Mahan. It is difficult to determine, however, how sophisticated their
appreciation of Mahan is, as aspects of his teachings seem to have been adopted
rather uncritically, for rhetorical purposes at least. Perhaps Mahan’s thought
represents a model of Western—particularly American—success in developing
comprehensive national power, especially in the maritime realm. This model
can serve flexibly as a touchstone for China’s own sea-power aspirations, much
as the Ming Dynasty mariner Zheng He’s legacy now serves as a sounding board
for Chinese maritime ideology and conceptions of maritime moral exceptional-
ism, independent of the exact historical details of his voyages.110 Asia Looks Seaward