Beyond Taiwan
The global oil shipping system successfully transports oil from some of the
world’s most unstable areas. It has functioned through wars, hurricanes, embar-
goes, canal closures, and other adverse situations. Yet maritime oil transport’s
fundamental flexibility and adaptability depend largely on global freedom of
navigation, which is upheld by the U.S. Navy. Without secure seas, the commer-
cial sector cannot unleash its ingenuity. Most oil importers are content to free
ride on U.S. naval protection. But some, such as China, are not. Thus, while
tanker operators engage in apolitical pursuit of profit, the process of ensuring
the free navigation that makes their operations possible is a highly geopolitical
affair.
China’s tanker-fleet plans will have significant geopolitical effects if China
makes protecting oil and other resource shipments a major priority for the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy or PLAN). Many Chinese naval
analysts’ writings emphasize the need for the capacity to protect sea lines of com-
munication, or SLOCs, at long range from Chinese shores. To date the Chinese
naval modernization drive has been heavily Taiwan-centric, but it is readily
conceivable that protecting maritime resource supply lines could become a key
‘‘beyond Taiwan’’ raison d’eˆtre for the PLAN.
China needs secure resource imports to sustain economic development. Speak-
ing at a Communist Party meeting on December 27, 2006, President Hu Jintao
bluntly stated that China needs a ‘‘powerful’’ ‘‘blue-water’’ navy prepared ‘‘at any
time’’ for military struggle to uphold its interests. This may entail creating a long-
distance SLOC protection capacity.^2
China’s 2006 Defense White Paper,China’s National Defense in 2006,
supports President Hu’s assertions. TheWhite Paper, the most authoritative
public statement of Beijing’s appraisal of the strategic environment and the
proper responses to that environment, states that China’s navy ‘‘aims at gradual
extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhanc-
ing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterat-
tacks.’’^3 Clearly, Beijing’s perceived need to secure seaborne energy supplies
may become an important post-Taiwan driver of Chinese naval moderniza-
tion.
Chinese analysts advocate strengthening the PLA Navy so that it is capable of
‘‘long range rapid responses and interventions in trouble spots’’ such as the Strait
of Malacca.^4 Indeed, Wu Lei, a prominent Chinese energy expert, explains that
‘‘the fear that the U.S. might cut [energy shipments] off as a result of the deterio-
ration of Sino-U.S. relations over the Taiwan issue drives much of Beijing’s
modernization of its navy and air forces.’’^5 As such, identifying and analyzing
the strategic rationale behind China’s state-led tanker-fleet expansion may help
illuminate China’s maritime policy and strategy.112 Asia Looks Seaward