commons, well beyond the nation-state’s territorial waters, and even beyond its
EEZ (exclusive economic zone). If a state has both the capability and the will
to become a maritime power, it will almost invariably have an impact on other
coastal states, either because of these states’ own use of the seas or because of its
ability to project power into their littorals. In other words, maritime power is a
tool of grand strategy and should serve national-level security goals. As noted in
appraisals of past U.S. strategy documents and in studies of what constitutes
good strategy, a clear linkage to national-level objectives is a critical determinant
of strategic success.^6
A first pass through New Delhi’s national security objectives, accompanied by
a brief discussion of how maritime power may (or may not) support each of these
objectives, will indicate whether and how maritime capabilities are worth the
investment of effort and resources as India contemplates the future. The national
security objectives New Delhi has made public are listed on the Ministry of
Defence Web site. The first—defending the country’s borders as defined by law
and enshrined in the constitution—is confined to the territorial sea. Indeed,
given India’s history of border wars with China and Pakistan, it appears largely
concerned with events on land. In all likelihood, only Pakistan would be both
willing and able to contest for control of Indian territorial waters over the short
term, and even then, it would do so only in very limited circumstances. In the
medium to long term, as China’s naval capabilities expand, India may confront
another challenge to its home waters. Some Indian analysts argue that, in view
of its extensive military presence in the Indian Ocean, the United States is the
naval power most able to infringe on India’s maritime borders. But the current
upswing in U.S.–Indian relations, particularly in the domain of naval co-
operation, renders such contingencies improbable.
India’s second national security objective—protecting the lives and property of
its citizens against war, terrorism, nuclear threats, and militant activities—is fairly
broad. Nevertheless, how maritime capabilities contribute to each of these areas
of concern is fairly straightforward. The IN has taken part in past wars with
Pakistan, most notably the 1971 war that led to the creation of the state of
Bangladesh. Protecting the lives and property of citizens, however, connotes
actions well beyond India’s frontiers. This implies that New Delhi might need
to project maritime power, sometimes in the course of protective missions, some-
times to strike at threats before they reach Indian shores.
How robust this power-projection capability should be depends on how Indian
officials size up the threat from distant states. While India faces a multitude of
terrorist and nuclear threats along its immediate borders, these problems may also
originate far from its shores, requiring fairly extensive reach. One time-tested way
to protect against nuclear threats, moreover, is to amass a retaliatory capability
that resides in either land- or sea-based delivery systems. Protecting against terror-
ism and militant activities requires guarding the nation’s borders from infiltration,
India as a Maritime Power? 127