Low-key security cooperation would probably be more acceptable to neighboring
states than IN vessels patrolling neartheir shores. Mohan fails to specify
how New Delhi can advance its interests in the second circle, but he phrases
most of the objectives in negative terms, seemingly deprecating the prospect of
cooperative endeavors at sea that support Indian goals.
A second set of missions in the middle circle involves counteracting activities
that could contribute to or evolve into strategic threats. Counterterrorism and
counterproliferation are prominent among these missions. Maritime interdiction
is one method of performing such missions. Again, Indian forces could under-
take such operations unilaterally but would probably benefit from international
cooperation, at least in terms of information sharing. India’s political-level deci-
sion to demur from the Proliferation Security Initiative thus could impair its
proliferation-related interdiction activities.^10 A third mission in this larger region
is forward presence, both to demonstrate political interest and to balance the
growing presence of other Asian maritime powers such as China. To hedge
against Chinese pretensions, India must consider how it can counter Chinese
naval power in the Indian Ocean should hostilities break out (a prospect Mohan
considers remote). At a minimum, as in the inner circle, the IN would need the
capacity to prosecute sea-control and sea-denial operations. Farther out from its
coasts, India must consider how it would conduct anti-surface warfare against
Chinese combatants in the Indian Ocean.
Finally, Mohan’s third, ‘‘rest of the world’’ circle envisions India taking its place
as a great power and a key player in international peace and security. This would
involve high-order maritime operations. Long-range power projection would
demand capabilities ranging from amphibious warfare to land attack to strategic
nuclear deterrence. Protecting or evacuating Indian citizens abroad would also
fall under the rubric of power projection. For instance, the IN conducted its first
NEO (noncombatant evacuation operation) off Lebanon in the summer of
- To prosecute missions of this complexity on a global basis requires the
ability to impose sea control far from Indian shores, coupled with substantial
underway-replenishment capabilities. In short, power projection may entail
high-end warfare, but it also involves peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster-
relief missions—critical efforts if India wishes to position itself as a leading
defender of international peace and security.
Mohan’s view of Indian grand strategy, particularly the goals New Delhi
should seek in each concentric circle, exhibits a realist bent. In 2001, Stephen
Cohen posited that there are three general worldviews among Indian elites:
Nehruvian, realist, and revitalist.^11 Mohan is clearly a member of the elite class,
and he falls most neatly into Cohen’s realist category. By contrast, the traditional
Nehruvian view Cohen outlines represents a mix of realism and liberal interna-
tionalism—a mix which U.S.-schooled international-relations theorists may find
it difficult to fathom. On the one hand, Nehru believed that the world was a
India as a Maritime Power? 131