dangerous place and that self-help was crucial to the state’s survival, but on the
other, he believed that ‘‘states can rise above ‘the rigors of anarchy and fashion
at least seasons and locales of peace and cooperation.’’’^12
Applied to the maritime aspects of Mohan’s concentric circles, the traditional
Nehruvian worldview gives rise to slightly different uses of maritime power.
Within the innermost circle, Indian leaders of Nehruvian inclinations would
probably still emphasize using maritime forces to deter and if necessary defeat
Pakistan in joint operations. In the second circle, however, they would likely
place greater emphasis on cooperative endeavors with neighbors in the Indian
Ocean littoral. Combined exercises, training, and operations would assume
high priority. This would represent a sensible seaward extension of the Gujral
Doctrine, which sought to reassure India’s smaller neighbors of New Delhi’s
benign strategic intentions in the region. Cooperative endeavors would
also extend to various Asian sea powers, notably China, Japan, the United States
(to the degree these powers operated at sea in the Indian Ocean basin), and
perhaps even Russia. It is not clear, moreover, that a modern Nehruvian thinker
would share Nehru’s distrust of China that sprang up after the 1962 war. Finally,
leaders possessed of this worldview would use maritime forces to help balance
other great powers, refraining from too-close ties with any of them—particularly
the United States.
On the world stage, a Nehruvian grand strategy would likely emphasize the
cooperative dimension of power projection, with humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief holding pride of place. A ‘‘recessed’’ nuclear deterrent—that is,
a deterrent that was not always at sea and ready to fire on short notice—would
form the nuclear component of a Nehruvian strategy.
The realist view would vary only slightly from the more militant Nehruvian
strain described by Cohen. Given realists’ faith in the market, using maritime
forces to ensure the security of seagoing trade—something presumably to be
encouraged under a market-friendly worldview—would likely take high priority.
Realists would orchestrate wide-reaching cooperative endeavors, and they would
accept navy-to-navy contacts and maneuvers with the United States more readily
than would Nehruvian officials. As Cohen notes, one of the main proponents of
realist policies, Jaswant Singh, has argued on behalf of looking well beyond
India’s borders. If New Delhi inclined to Singh’s view, it would become far more
active in the Mohan’s second and third circles, amassing capabilities for maritime
power projection and nuclear deterrence.
Finally, the revitalist strain in Indian strategic thinking, prevalent among
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh supporters of the BJP, would reserve its
energies primarily for Mohan’s innermost circle. The principal goal of a revitalist
grand strategy would be to secure the Indian homeland and nearby areas where
Indians reside. The latter might include Indian diasporas in the Middle East
and, to a lesser degree, in Southeast Asia. Leaders animated by this somewhat132 Asia Looks Seaward