(2) ‘‘other means’’ such as land power, air power, or joint and combined warfare;
(3) technology; (4) maritime geography; (5) resources; and (6) a maritime
economy. Measuring an Asian country’s endowment of these constituents and
gauging how they interact with national institutions, traditions, and culture offer
a valuable tool for analyzing the future of sea power in Asia.^18
The benchmarks for sea power put forward by Mahan and Till provide one
vantage point from which to survey maritime affairs in contemporary Asia.
Second, to what extent will Asian thinkers fair their own historical and cultural
traditions into their naval and maritime strategies? Whether aspiring Asian
sea powers incline to Mahan’s more military-intensive perspective on nautical
matters, embrace Corbett’s wider perspective, or fashion their own, distinctive
synthesis of Western and non-Western strategic thought will say much about
the future of the region. What would happen, for instance, should a regional
power predisposed to think and act in Mahanian terms square off against a rival
indifferent to seagoing pursuits or with a far different vision of sea power? Likely
interactions among these powers are worth pondering as the United States and its
allies attempt to keep pace with events.
Whether strategic thinkers and decision-makers regard sea power as a universal
or a regional phenomenon carries significant implications. This is no idle debate,
as twentieth-century Asian history attests. For instance, many Japanese strategic
thinkers in the early decades of the century hewed to Mahanian theory—a theory
better suited to global maritime powers such as contemporary Great Britain or a
rising United States—while Japan’s maritime interests were confined to East
and Southeast Asia. While imperial Tokyo was indifferent to obtaining the
island bases Mahan had espoused, it cast its gaze onto the Asian mainland,
with fateful consequences. Similarly, whether seafaring Asian nations see their
interests and sea-power potential as local or global is a question of considerable
moment for regional stability and peace. A regional power thinking in global
terms could upset the Asian maritime equilibrium, as it did during the 1930s
and 1940s.
What is the primary goal of naval power? For Mahan, ‘‘command of the sea’’
connoted ‘‘overbearing power’’ that swept enemy fleets from vital waters, choking
off the sea lanes to enemy warships and merchantmen while preserving the
dominant sea power’s liberty to exploit the oceans for its own commercial and
military purposes.^19 Corbett, by contrast, deemed an uncommanded sea the
normal state of affairs in both wartime and peacetime. He and like-minded
strategists such as Charles E. Callwell stressed the interdependence of land and
sea power, shifting the emphasis from major fleet actions on the high seas to
sea-lane security and amphibious operations.^20 Such views find expression in
post–Cold War doctrinal publications such as the U.S. Navy’sFrom the Sea,which
takes American sea control as a given, devoting its attention to how U.S. naval
forces can influence events ashore. Clearly, an Asian sea power of Mahanian8 Asia Looks Seaward