CHAPTER 8
JAPANESE MARITIME THOUGHT:
IF NOT MAHAN,WHO?
James R. Holmes
The late Colonel John Boyd, who knew a thing or two about strategic thought,
was fond of declaring that excellence in warfare and other human endeavors
depended on people, ideas, and hardware—in that order.^1 This chapter postulates
that Japan has lost sight of this commonsense axiom, allowing strategic thought to
atrophy. If so, this decline in strategic thought could impede Tokyo’s ability to act
outside the confines of the U.S.–Japanese security alliance—as it might need to,
given the rise of an increasingly capable, sea-power-minded China and mounting
frictions between Beijing and Tokyo. The chapter asks the following questions to
assess the state of strategic thinking in Japan’s naval forces:
- Why does maritime strategy matter now, in an increasingly interconnected world?
Does economic interdependence eliminate the resort to power politics? - How did Alfred Thayer Mahan view sea power and its uses? How much influence did
Mahan exert in Imperial Japan? - How strictly did the IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) adhere to Mahan’s theories, and,
when it departed from Mahanian theory, why, and with what impact? - How much continuity was there in strategic thinking between the IJN and the MSDF
(Maritime Self-Defense Force)? What impact did any shifts in strategic thought have? - Which strategic theorists do Japanese naval officials consult when they are grappling
with vexing issues? If not Mahan, who? - If indeed strategic thought has languished in postwar Japan’s maritime forces, how might
political and military leaders revive it? To which strategic theorists should they look?
The chapter closes with a few observations and policy recommendations for
Tokyo’s naval establishment. Given the preliminary nature of this inquiry,
it is somewhat open-ended, in hopes of starting a sorely needed debate in