Some coastal communities, such as Sicily, consciously choose to be landbound,
while other political entities ‘‘become seagoing...as a result of a complex series
of cultural decisions and attitudes.’’ In this latter category, some maritime states
‘‘construct and maintain all apparatus of maritime life,’’ while other seagoing
societies ‘‘use the ocean as a source of cultural stimulus and a means of artistic
expression.’’ In short, diversity rather than commonality characterizes the activ-
ities and the relative strengths and weaknesses of coastal states.
The rest of this opening chapter focuses on China’s maritime past. Perry’s
central hypothesis is that ‘‘the means were there’’ for China to erect a maritime-
based regional order in East Asia, ‘‘but not the will.’’ First, China’s riverine
civilization tied itself closely to the Yellow and Yangtze rivers, both of which
were inhospitable to seaward voyages. Second, even as its southward enlargement
helped reorient Chinese civilization toward the Asian seas, the relative ease of
coastal commerce had a ‘‘corrupting’’ influence that discouraged an oceanic out-
look. Third, the ‘‘grasping hand’’ of government bureaucracy, which depended
on fees and bribes exacted from riverine trade, frowned upon maritime activities
that were beyond its immediate reach. Fourth, endemic piracy along the East
Asian littoral created a twin-pronged problem. Because pirates were motivated
by short-term profits, they were never able to forge a longer-term, politically
drivenoceanicidentity.Atthesametime, piracy generated lasting antipathy
toward the seas on the part of the Confucian-based bureaucracy. Finally, periodic
oceanic ventures proved short-lived, failing under the Mongols before being
superseded by continental threats under the Ming Dynasty. Perry concludes that
modern China’s turn to the sea, unshackled by the constraints of the past, ‘‘surely
is one of the great events of our time.’’
Nicholas E. Sarantakes recounts the critical decisions and debates surrounding
Great Britain’s strategic position in Asia during the interwar period, when
the nation’s inability to police Asian waters was becoming increasingly evident.
The author’s main proposition is that while the British acquitted themselves
relatively well in their assessments of maritime Asia, ‘‘it was luck...that was
the key factor in determining the success of British strategy in the years
following World War I.’’ Sarantakes attributes British luck to the behavior of a
cooperative adversary, namely Japan. The author begins by thoroughly docu-
menting the indecision and drift that characterized British policy toward
Japan. On the one hand, Japanese naval power eclipsed that of Britain after
the Great War. Tokyo’s ambitions, moreover, increasingly encroached on British
interests in Asia, particularly British economic interests in China. On the
other hand, no suitable counterweight was available—the Americans were
discounted as too unreliable—to balance or deter Japan. London thus was
in no position either to challenge Japanese ascendance directly or to enlist
third-party assistance to preserve an Asian maritime order favorable to British
interests.10 Asia Looks Seaward