Asia Looks Seaward

of alternative sea lanes. Four options for alternative sea lanes have been consid-

ered: constructing a 250 kilometer oil pipeline or canal across the Kra Peninsula

to connect the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Siam; using the shallow Sunda Strait

between Sumatra and Java; using the Lombok Strait east of Java; and laying down

a pipeline connecting Gulf of Bengal seaports in Myanmar to Kunming in

Yunnan.^5

Overall, China’s growing energy demand has two major implications for

the region. First, energy will clearly play a more prominent role in China’s

grand strategy and in its diplomatic, political, and military relationships with

its neighbors. Second, Southeast Asia has a unique role to play here, for several

reasons. The region represents a major, nearby source of supply for oil, gas, and

other resources. States there are politically stable, particularly relative to the

Middle East. They have an interest in economic development—that is, in being a

preferred, stable source of supply for Beijing’s needs. Finally, China has very

recently begun to perceive a vital national interest in ensuring that the sea lines

of communication remain open, secure, safe, and peaceful. Southeast Asian states

play a major role in contributing to a more or a less safe environment for the

massive amounts of energy and other cargo that transit the subregion.

The South China Sea: Peace Now, Conflict Later?

TheSCSistheworld’sfifthlargestbodyofwater,coveringanareaofsome

3.5 million square kilometers, stretching from the Singapore and Malacca straits

to the Taiwan Strait. It is one of the world’s busiest waterways, with some

three-quarters of total oil and natural gas shipments transiting the sea annually,

forming a lifeline from the Middle East fields to the dynamic economies of East

Asia. One-half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage sails through the

Malacca Strait and the Straits of Sunda and Lombok.^6 The transit of oil through

the SCS is three times that through the Suez Canal and fifteen times that which

flows through Panama, and the volume is expected to double by 2020. Japan

currently receives 75 percent of its oil via the SCS, Taiwan 70 percent, and the

ROK 75 percent (figures for China are above). The sea is also one of the world’s

largest sources of fish production, providing the majority of protein in the diets

of much of the Asia-Pacific.

The potential for conflict lies in the competing territorial claims asserted by

China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Most of these

claims involve the Spratly Islands and the potential resources around them, while

Vietnam and Taiwan also claim the Paracel Islands, which have been controlled

by China since 1974. The underlying issue is that China claims the entire sea

and all of the resources within and beneath it. Beijing bases its territorial claims

on occupation for some two thousand years and on the notable absence of

competing claims for most of that time. Beijing promulgates its policy using

172 Asia Looks Seaward