markers. China responded by sending ships to survey the Philippine-claimed
Panata and Kota islands. The Philippine Navy arrested Chinese sailors near the
shoal in January 1998; in the same month, Vietnamese sailors fired on a
Philippine fishing boat near Pigeon Reef.^8 In 1999, Malaysia seized Navigator
Reef, claimed by the Philippines, and in August 2002 Vietnamese troops
based on one rock fired at Philippine military aircraft. Vietnam commenced
rebuilding one runway on a disputed Spratly island with the goal of sending
tourists there.^9 Currently Vietnam occupies about twenty-two ‘‘islands,’’ the
Philippines eleven, China fourteen, Malaysia ten, and Taiwan Itu Aba.
Many analysts see a trend, crystallizing in the 1990s and coming to fruition in
the past decade, toward less conflict, more joint development, and increased
interest on Beijing’s part in the peaceful settlement of disputes in the SCS. This
may indeed be a recent trend, but the question is how deep are the currents
beneath it. Following Beijing’s adoption of the 1992 law on territoriality,
for example, ASEAN responded with a Declaration on the South China Sea.
The declaration was based on the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a
foundational ASEAN document enshrining the principles of noninterference
and sovereignty. China initially rejected the Declaration, along with its call for
multilateral consultations, but Beijing began to reassert its peaceful intentions
following a negative reaction from its neighbors. It did so at the first ASEAN
Regional Forum meeting in July 1994, and thereafter Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen agreed explicitly to some form of multilateral negotiations based on the
UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). Beijing nonetheless repeated
its claims to jurisdictions over the entire SCS, asserting that it would negotiate
only on conduct—not on sovereignty.
If there was some ASEAN unity on the issue, it fractured in the 1990s, when
the Philippines and Vietnam supported a stronger multilateral agreement, as well
as provisions for joint exploration. Their proposals were rejected by Malaysia,
which moved closer to the Chinese position and began to support bilateralism
more strongly. (This move should be seen in the context of Kuala Lumpur’s
general disenchantment with U.S. foreign policy at this time.) Malaysia proposed
its own, nonbinding, weak document, which was in turn rejected by Vietnam
andthePhilippines,whichwantedabindingdocument.Theresultwasthe
November 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea, in which parties agree to resolve territorial disputes without the resort to
force, and to exercise self-restraint. The declaration also promotes scientific
research, environmental protection, safety at sea, and concerns for transnational
crime.
The declaration may be part of ASEAN’s search ‘‘for explicit confirmation that
China’s presence in the South China Sea will not jeopardize peaceful coexist-
ence.’’^10 Yet the declaration does not define the area to which it is supposed to
apply, thus leaving it unclear whether it extends to the Spratlys, to the Paracels,174 Asia Looks Seaward