or to the SCS as a whole. It does not include many other interested parties,
including Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, Japan, or the United States; nor does
it invite interested parties to join. It does not prohibit the improvement of
existing structures or the creation of structures on territory already occupied.
And it states that any future modificationstotheCodeofConductshalltake
place on the basis of consensus.^11
Several recent agreements have provided cause for hope that further clashes can
be avoided. China’s October 2003 decision to adhere to the total allowable catch
(TAC) agreement made it the first non-ASEAN state to do so. China and the
Philippines signed a seismic survey agreement in 2004 and were joined by
Vietnam in 2005. Discussions were held in 2006 between China and ASEAN
on moving toward a binding code of conduct, and at the East Asian Summit in
early 2007, all sixteen states agreed on the importance of energy conservation
and security.^12
On the other hand, Taiwan, increasingly marginalized in discussions on the
SCS, announced plans in 2006 to build a 1,150-meter runway on Itu Aba
‘‘for humanitarian purposes.’’ Japan, with continuing vital interests in a secure
Malacca Strait and its own direct territorial dispute with China, has also been
marginalized in discussions.
Pushing the issue of territoriality aside makes sense only until one party feels
that the acknowledged intrusion on its sovereignty approaches the level of a vital
national interest. The short history above showed that various Asian governments
have felt this at various times in the recent past, and so it would be a mistake to
attribute the absence of open conflict for a few years to fundamentally altered
views of sovereignty. As recently as December 2006, a Foreign Ministry spokes-
man in Hanoi labeled China’s planting of markers a ‘‘violation of Vietnam’s
sovereignty.’’^13 Furthermore, there has been little to no movement on the nature
of the claims, with China relying on history and occupation, Vietnam on histori-
cal use (Hanoi recognized China’s claims until 1975), the Philippines on proxim-
ity and native son Thomas Cloma’s 1956 ‘‘discovery’’ of some unoccupied areas
in the Spratlys, and Malaysia and Brunei mostly on particular interpretations of
UNCLOS.
Indeed, the underlying nature of the claims and the increasing importance
of energy may outstrip states’ ability to keep territoriality off the table. The
1992 Declaration applies only to ASEAN member states, while the 2002 Decla-
ration relies upon consensually based norms and notably excludes many
interested parties. As the Norwegian-Russian experience on sharing resources
and settling boundaries demonstrates, if territorial disputes are not settled first,
interpretations of resource-sharing agreements can change along with changing
power balances.^14 The twin underlying realities of growing power asymmetry
and persistent territorial disputes will work in favor of the more powerful
actors.
China–Southeast Asia Relations 175