The regional economy maintains an unprecedented strong momentum of growth, and a
framework of open and mutually beneficial cooperation based on equality and in diver-
sified forms is taking shape in the region. Multilateral security dialogue and cooperation
are being enhanced. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has entered a new stage of
substantive growth, contributing to the establishment of a new mode of state-to-state
relations. ASEAN has made steady progress in community-building and in talks on
establishing free trade areas with other countries. East Asian cooperation, which is con-
ducted mainly through the ASEAN plus China, Japan and the ROK (10+3) channel,
has expanded in scope and its institutional building is improving constantly, continuing
to play a major role in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific
region. The East Asia Summit has provided a new platform for East Asian cooperation.^20Denny Roy concludes that ‘‘Chinese diplomacy has succeeded to the point
where most Southeast Asians seem persuaded that China does not pose an imme-
diate security threat.’’^21 Yet China clearly uses multilateralism, as Christopher
Hughes writes, to protect core national interests by preventing the rise of a
regional hegemon. In addition, China is gaining a great deal of control over its
relationship with Southeast Asia through its desire for a China-ASEAN Free
Trade Area by 2015, as demonstrated by the November 2002 Framework Agree-
ment. Hughes sees evidence of increasing Chinese power exertion in the 2004
agreement for PRC and ASEAN representatives to the UN to engage in regular
consultations, in the joint PRC-ASEAN position that the UN should play a
leading role in the reconstruction of Iraq, and in ASEAN’s statement of support
for China’s role on the North Korea problem.^22 The 2003 Joint Declaration on
the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership, expressing a hope that APT would
lead to the development of an ‘‘East Asian community,’’ can be seen as further
evidence given the preponderant role China would play in setting the norms
and rules of such a community. Furthermore, little progress has been made on
the central maritime border issues. There has been no progress toward settle-
ments with Japan or, in the SCS, with Vietnam over the Paracels.
Chinese leaders may also be intellectually predisposed against fully acknowl-
edging the role of international agreements and regimes. As Peter Kien-Hong
Yu writes, mainland Chinese leaders do not distinguish between the many kinds
of international regimes, mechanisms, and systems, and in fact have no standard
way to translate or transliterate the phrase ‘‘international regime.’’ Neither U.S.
nor Southeast Asian leaders have sought to present overarching settlements in a
dialectical way that is acceptable to Beijing. Nor have Southeast Asian claimants
convinced Beijing that there is a good reason to accept a constraining, multilat-
eral settlement.^23 Kuik Cheng-Chwee notes that Beijing is much more comfort-
able with economic institutions than with security institutions due to the
inherent requirement that a degree of sovereignty be surrendered in the latter.
As Yu also notes, the nature of the sovereignty disputes allows for no obvious
solution or settlement; nor does UNCLOS, as is evidenced by the parties’
various interpretations of it to support their claims. In one exhaustive study,178 Asia Looks Seaward