Mark Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig have proposed several
schemes for dividing up the territory and resources of the SCS, but they acknowl-
edge that no one scheme is likely to be satisfactory to all or even most of the
claimants.^24
A skeptical member of the Southeast Asian political community might
conclude that power, in the end, will determine how competing sovereignty
claims are settled. Such sentiments are not, however, revealed in the behavior of
Southeast Asian governments.
Southeast Asia’s Response to the Rise of China
China’s primary goal with respect to ASEAN is to prevent bandwagoning with
the United States, which may be said to have characterized ASEAN policy during
the Cold War. This now appears less likely and is critical given the borders with
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. How has Southeast Asia responded to the rise
of China? Regional and individual state behavior are most often described using
a mix of the political science and policy prescriptive terms of balancing, bandwa-
goning, engagement, and hedging. Where one falls on this spectrum is often
determined by the lenses one brings to the study. David Kang finds predominant
bandwagoning, Yuen Foong Khong finds ‘‘soft balancing’’ amid a constructed
discourse of uncertainty, and Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan find predomi-
nant balancing amid institution-building and norm construction.^25
If we use a strict neorealist definition of balancing, no states in the region are
doing so. That is, states are not concertedly building up militarily or forming
strong military alliances in order to confront a perceived near-term threat.^26 This
excludes a great deal of behavior that is directed against a potential long-term
threat, however, including the maintenance of good defense relationships with
the United States and the execution of some military modernization. Thus, if
we lower the bars regarding intent, time horizon, and actions taken, we can see
that many states are pursuing a mix of strategies.
Indonesian military leaders privately label China the country’s greatest military
threat, with a major challenge being Chinese claims to the Natuna Islands and
their possible energy reserves. Yet Indonesia realizes that China is a major buyer
of its bulk commodities and may be a more dependable supplier of weapons than
the United States, and so it balances less than do Singapore, Thailand, and
perhaps the Philippines.
The Singapore–Washington relationship is something between an alliance
and a strong friendship. Singapore hosts the U.S. Navy’s western logistics base
and has built a pier at Changi Naval Base for U.S. aircraft carriers. For its part,
Thailand remains a ‘‘major non-NATO ally’’ and yet engages with China on
economic growth, criticizes Taiwan and Falun Gong, and has offered lukewarm
support to the United States concerning Iraq. The Philippines clearly perceives
China–Southeast Asia Relations 179