an external threat and realizes that it has been too weak since 1995 to defend its
claims in the Spratlys. The 1997 Visiting Forces Agreement and the 2003
Mutual Logistics Support Agreement led to the Philippines being labeled, along
with Singapore and Thailand, a ‘‘major non-NATO ally’’ in 2003. Major joint
exercises and a U.S. role in fighting Abu Sayyaf have solidified the balancing
nature of the Philippines’ approach.
Vietnam and the United States have gone further down the road of full diplo-
matic normalization. The Bilateral Trade Agreement has increased trade dramati-
cally, U.S. naval ships are making port visits, the two states are cooperating on
AIDS, and high-level political visits have occurred. Vietnam continues to push
its claims in the SCS by pursuing deals on exploration and prospecting, and
violence continues to flare, as in 2005 when Vietnamese fishermen strayed into
Chinese waters. Vietnam supports a U.S. military presence and cooperates on
counterterrorism, drugs, demining, search and rescue, and disaster relief.
Vietnamese observers attend Cobra Gold, U.S. naval vessels now visit Vietnam,
and the 2005 visit of the Vietnamese prime minister to Washington promised
further cooperation.^27
Malaysia and the United States have increasingly cooperated since 2001, with
defense ties also growing, including a rapidly growing number of U.S. ship visits
(e.g., that of the carrier USSJohn C. Stennisin 2004), and providing jungle train-
ing for U.S. troops. The former Malaysian prime minister has said publicly he
does not consider the PRC a threat and that China should remain a constructive
player.
The one unifying theme to ASEAN state responses is the attempt to use eco-
nomic cooperation and engagement to manage security relations with China.
This is not a new strategic innovation. It derives from a set of ideas about how
states may use trade and other economic flows to structure anarchy in ways that
create common interests among states, dampen security competition, and
support an ordered international system in which the ‘‘expectation of war
disappears’’ as states resolve conflicts through ‘‘judicial processes, not coercive
bargaining.’’^28 In fact, these ideas have had a powerful impact in shaping the
present world. According to Richard Rosecrance inThe Rise of the Virtual State,
growing international economic integration is held to render societies increas-
ingly dependent upon others for their prosperity, to make war more costly, and
to create strong mutual interests in peace.^29 In a related thesis, Thomas Friedman
holds that deepening integration convinces individuals to seek personal prosper-
ity rather than national glory, thereby weakening the status and influence of the
military within society and politics. ‘‘People in McDonald’s countries,’’ writes
Friedman, ‘‘prefer to wait in line for burgers’’ than to fight.^30
While conflict may not occur over the SCS, the Southeast Asian policy
response is unlikely to prevent it, as it rests of mistaken assumptions. In a recent
study of European security politics in pre–World War I Europe, David Rowe has180 Asia Looks Seaward