Erickson’s exhaustive survey of Chinese naval modernization starts by review-
ing Beijing’s most recent Defense White Paper,China’s National Defense
in 2006.The chapter then evaluates China’s military budget before turning to
the submarine force; the PLAN’s capacity for mine warfare; the surface and
amphibious fleets; the naval air force; the navy’s command, control, communica-
tions, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and
its efforts in the area of carrier aviation. Subsequent sections consider China’s
base infrastructure, training, and doctrine. From this analysis, Erickson infers
that China is merging its own history and strategic traditions with those of the
West and applying the resulting, hybrid sea-power theory to East Asian waters.
Precisely what this portends for regional peace and stability remains unclear.
Gabriel Collins complements Andrew Erickson’s appraisal of the PLA Navy
with an assessment of the Chinese commercial tanker fleet,rounding out this
volume’s inquiry into Chinese sea power. Collins points out that the energy
shipping business carries political overtones, imparting ‘‘a strong national secu-
rity flavor to many actions that in other sectors would be considered purely com-
mercial.’’ Who is behind the construction of an enormous, Chinese-flagged
tanker fleet? The author asks whether China’s political leadership is demanding
a large national tanker fleet as a way to assure a steady flow of oil and gas supplies,
or whether Chinese shipping firms are manipulating political leaders’ feelings of
insecurity for commercial gain. He inclines to the latter view while also allowing
for the geopolitical implications of China’s surging maritime trade and its
seemingly unquenchable thirst for oil.
Collins observes that Beijing is looking beyond Taiwan as it contemplates
the nation’s energy security. Protection of the SLOCs ‘‘at long range from Chinese
shores’’ could become a major priority for the PLA Navy, if indeed it has
not already. In late 2006, no less a figure than President Hu Jintao advocated a
‘‘blue-water’’ navy prepared ‘‘at any time’’ to defend China’s nautical interests by
force of arms. The Strait of Malacca, the conduit for most of the nation’s foreign
oil, preoccupies Hu and his advisers. The American, Japanese, and even Indian
navies pose concerns for a China worried about its interests at sea. The author
nonetheless maintains that security concerns are secondary to commercial
imperatives in China’s tanker-fleet buildup. The industry’s adherence to market
principles, the practical difficulties ofrecalling tankers to national service in
wartime, and other factors cast doubt on Beijing’s effort to put to sea a national
‘‘oil armada.’’
Turning from East to South Asia, Andrew C. Winner appraises the efficacy of
Indian maritime doctrine, strategy, and forces, asking whether and when this
South Asian continental power will become a viable seagoing power. Observes
Winner, Indian officials and pundits ‘‘have begun to speak the language of
maritime power,’’ but nevertheless ‘‘one searches in vain for a formal Indian
maritime strategy document.’’ To discern some of the nonmaterial drivers behind12 Asia Looks Seaward