Indeed, once those conflicts are settled, it is likely Beijing will turn to securing
its southern flank, where, as with Taiwan, it has what it considers to be unsettled
borders, with adversaries that, generally speaking, would rank as smaller than
moderate sized. Coterminous with this shift would be the development, as stated
in current plans for the second long-term phase of defense development strategy,
covering 2011 to 2020, of a military that is the equal of the military of any
second-tier nation, including Japan, Russia, or the western European powers.
Thus both near- and medium-term plans and acquisitions will provide China
with a preponderant naval and air presence, particularly in the SCS area.
What Drives China’s Policies?
It is worth attempting to tease out the various possible motivations in Chinese
policy toward the SCS in order to hypothesize on the extent to which compromise
or new solutions are possible. One line of thought might fall roughly into the
category of ‘‘defensive realism.’’ Peter Kien-Hong Yu emphasizes the role of walls
in Chinese history and culture and sees the U-shaped line as a southern, maritime
counterpart to the Great Wall in the north, with James Shoal as the perceived
southernmost territory of China. In this view, the late addition of this maritime
wall to China’s strategic thinking reflects the historic lack of threats from the
south and the emergence of Western industrialization and imperialism. It also
reflects Beijing’s desire, which originated during the 1950s and 1960s, to assert
exclusive claims over portions of the territory and resources of the sea. China
views the SCS as akin to internal waters. Since its first use in 1914, the line has
always had notable ‘‘breaks’’ in it (Taiwan’s version is dotted) signaling the rights
of passage and international use.^39
On the other hand, James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara describe what could be
a trend that could be away from defensive realism. They note that Chinese plan-
ners look to the nineteenth-century navalist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who instructs
them that their contiguous waters are their domain and that dominant sea power
is essential. This is in keeping with tradition as well, since China has long consid-
ered the SCS a national preserve. Mahan’s formula of ‘‘commerce, bases and ship-
ping’’ means, among other things, that China needs bases such as Itu Aba, one of
the largest in the Spratlys, as well as adjacent cays. Together, the authors note,
these would constitute a presence superior to that of Mischief Reef. Beijing will
also need, they argue, seagoing communications along the coasts and northern
edge of the SCS, where opponents couldpotentially foil operations against
Taiwan. The drive for energy security only reinforces these needs. Yu, too,
acknowledges that domestic politics and nationalism may also play an increasing
role in Chinese claims concerning the SCS, as well as in the other interested states.
Economic development and energy security comprise a third set of possible
motivations. As described above, economic modernization has been the
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